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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY
INSl~R.A.NCE COMPANY OF WIS-

CONSIN,
Plain.tiff a.nd App·ella.nt

-vs.-

Civil No. 7733

ALLEX OIL COMPANY and KENNETH THORESEN,
Defendants and Respondents

LA FORGE DASTRUP and FLORA
DASTRUP,
Plaintiffs and Appellants
-vs.-

Civil No. 7734

ALLEN OIL COMPANY and KENNETH THORESEN,
Defendants and Respondents
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents are not satisfied that the Statement
of F!acts by Appellants is complete enough to convey
to the Court the length of the trial, the amount of
testimony, the technical nature of the testimony and the
factual matter relating to the points at issue, and does
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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2
not give an accurate statement of the facts, and therefore,
the Respondents make the following Statement of Facts,
and point out statements in the Appellants' Statement
of Facts which the Respondents contend do not convey
the exact factual matter.
As an example of the Respondents' contention that
the factual matter stated by Appellants in their Statement of F'acts is not inclusive and conclusive, the
Respondents point out as follows:
That on page 2 of Appellants' Brief, the statement
is made that the gasoline fire and explosion occurred
while the Defendant was making a delivery of the gasoline to the Dastrup premises. Flora Dastrup testified
(T. 168), that Mr. Thoresen arrived around 2:00 or 2:30
in the afternoon. She further testified that after Mr.
Thoresen started to run the gas into the white tank,
she went back into the store (T. 169).
Neal Dastrup testified that he got off the tanker to
go into the store to make out a bill for Mr. Cox, after
Mr. Cox had got there (T. 162). That it took about
twenty minutes to run the gasoline out of the tanker into
the No. 1 tank (T. 161). And thereafter, Thoresen connected up the hose to tank No. 2 (T. 161). That Mr.
Thoresen arrived about 2:00 o'clock (T. 150). That as
soon as the East tank was full, he changed the hose
and began dumping in the center tank (T. 152). That
the gasoline came out on the ground (T. 154), and that
Thoresen came out and shut the gas off (T. 154). That
he saw the R. E. A. pickup drive in (T. 155). That
he went into the store to make a bill out for Mr. Cox,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and that he had just sat down in some booths there 'vhen
he heard the explosion (T. 155) and (T. 157). That he
stayed on the tanker at least tvventy minutes before he
went in the house (T. f58). That he stayed up on the
tanker to see that the tanks were empty (T. 159). That
it took about twenty minutes to run the gasoline out of
the tanker into the No. 1 tank (T. 161). That when he
went into the store, he went in to read the paper and
the letter he had gotten from his father (T. 163). That
he couldn't say how long the gas had been running into
tank No.2 when he got off the tanker (T. 165). That he
thinks he was in the store maybe two minutes when the
explosion occurred (T. 165). That he doesn't know,
with respect to the time the middle tank was started to
be filled, when Mr. Cox drove in (T. 158). That he saw
Mr. Cox drive in and went to make out the bill for his
gasoline (T. 157). That after Mr. Thoresen came out
of the store, he saw Mr. Cox on the outside (T. 155).
And as to tne statement made on page 3 of the Appellants' Statement of Facts, see Mr. Cox's testimony, that
he agreed that the statement he made, dated September
4, 1946 (T. 336) was his statement now, and in that
statement, he said that when he pulled up to the station
he noticed the filling hose of the tanker was attached
to the Ethyl tank, the far West tank (T. 336).

That

he came to the gas station shortly after 3 :00 o'clock
(T. 329). And as previously p,ointed out, Neal Dastrup
and Flora Dastrup both testified that the time when
Mr. Thoresen arrived was somewhere around 2 :00 or
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2 :30 in the afternoon. This is to amplify the statement
1nade at the top of page 4 of Appellants'. Brief.
In the first sentence of page 4, the statement is
made that Mrs. Dastrup warned Mr. Thoresen that the
center of the three tanks, owned by the Dastrups, was
slightly tilted, and reference is made to Transcript 169.
It is submitted that there is no statement to that effect
at all on page 169 of the Transcript. All Mrs. Dastrup
said there was that there wouldn't be room for all the
gas in the center tank and that it wouldn't hold the full
load, and that she cautioned him not to overflow this
tank. And on Transcript 408, which is given as a reference, Mr. Thoresen testified only that he was cautioned
not to overflow that center tank, and that a measurement
was made of the center tank and that it would take about
2280 or 2290 gallons to fill that one tank (T. 408).
With relation to the statement that Thoresen put
a metal nozzle into a metal intake into the center tank
in a negligent manner, the Court can examine Exhibit
"A", the nozzle and see what kind of metal it's made of
( T. 120). Thoresen testified that the caps are the same
composition as the valves, "I think they are bronze"
(T. 400). And with regard to the grating of the iron
causing the spark, it is interesting to read the testimony
of Dr. tt;y.~~t..·'Cr. 550) and ( T. 565). Dr. Gardner testified that the coupler was brass ( T. 309-310). Thoresen
said that he heard a pump start up (T. 401). That the
swing joint gives considerable play (T. 64).
A statement is made on page 4 of the Appellants'
Statement of Facts, that a large quantity of gasoline
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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overflowed fron1 the fill pipe onto the surrounding pavement, as well as on the island. Neal Dastrup (T. 154)
stated that it began to overflow and the gas ran on the
ground and he ran out and shut the gas off (referring
to ~Ir. Thoresen). That Neal Dastrup· stayed on the
tanker until ~Ir. Thoresen had turned off the gas that
was overflo,ving on the ground (T. 158). In answer
to a question, as to whether any gas spilled at all, the
Defendant, Thoresen, testified (T. 397) : "There might,
as the air comes up, there might have been a few drops,
maybe a quart. There might have been a little more;
but there was no amount of gasoline spilt." (T. 398).
That a very few drops spilled on the ground that day
(T. 412). There is no statement whatever in the record
that any gasoline was spilled on the island where the
pumps were located, and as a matter of fact, referring
to Dr. Cook's testimony, it is plain from his statement,
that if there were, it would not run under the pumps
(T. 521). And see also Dr. Bryner's testimony (T. 558)
and (T. 548). Mr. Thoresen's testimony is to the effect
that when he came out of the store, the small amount
of gas which was to run into the No. 3 tank had already
run out of the tanker. That he was putting gas into the
West tank (T. 398-399). That when he came out of
the store, he disconnected the hose from the third compartment (T. 399). That he never drop·ped the .wrench
(T. 407). That it was a half minute or more after he
laid down the wrench that the explosion took place
(T. 407).

That there were two drag chains on the

trailer (T. 394).

That he had put the hose into the
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West tank, the third compartment, before he went into
the store (T. 398). That he had been filling the West
tank (T. 285).
Of course, the statement made on page 5 of the
Appellants' Brief, is not a statement of fact, and as
will be seen by referring to the pleadings, no such contention was ever made by the Appellants, either in the
Amended Complaint or the last amendment, which purported to be an amendment to conform to proof (T. 845),
nor was there any proof offered to support the Amended
Complaint. Nowhere in said pleadings is there any statement made about walking upon the pavement or gravel.
THE PLEADINGS AND SUMMONS AND MOTIONS
TO QUASH.
(a)

La F'Orge Dastrup and Flora Dastrup, his wife,
Plaintiffs filed an action against Allen Oil Company, a
corporation and Kenneth Thoresen, Defendants, which
was originally commenced by a Complaint filed April
7, 1947, and which case was filed in the District Court of
Duchesne County, State of Utah. The Complaint and
Answer were stipulated into the Record, (T. 574-575).
Later on, on January 20, 1948, the plaintiffs moved for
dismissal of their action, without prejudice, and on the
23rd day of January, 1948, the Honorable William Stanley Dunford, the Judge of the District Court, dismissed
said action without prejudice.
On August 22, 1949, the Plaintiff, Employers Mutual
Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin, a corporation, filed an action against Allen Oil Company and
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Kenneth Thoresen, Defendants, in case No. 2551, in the
District Court of Duchesne County, State of Utah (T.
8:20). To this 'vas interposed a Demurrer and Motion to
Quash, \Yhich speak for themselves (T. 828). The Motion
to Quash \Yas denied (T. 839), and an Answer was filed.
Before that time, on September 16, 1948, La F·orge
Dastrup and Flora Dastrup, his wife, commenced a new
action against the Allen Oil Company and Kenneth
Thoresen, in case No. 2494, in Duchesne County District
Court.
That case No. 2551 is designated the "Employers"
case, and case No. 2494 is designated the "Dastrup" case.
In the Employers case, service upon the Allen Oil Cumpany was attempted to be made by serving one Howard J.
Williams, who the Deputy Sheriff stated to be the last
President (T. 835), and in the Dastrup case, the service
was attempted to be made upon Wendell Allen, President,
as shown at (T. 616).
In the Dastrup case, a Motion to Quash was made
(T. 626) and denied. The Summons in the Dastrup case
was entitled, In the Second Judicial District, in and for
the County of Duchesne, (T. 613), as well as in the Employers case ·(T. 834).
In support of the Motions to Quash in both cases,
there was filed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Decree, in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, In the
Matter of the Dissolution of Allen Oil Company, a Utah
corporation, case No. 81465. Said Decree having been
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signed by the Honorable J. Allen Crockett, District
Judge.
Thereafter, the plaintiffs in the Dastrup case filed
an An1ended Complaint, dated September 2, 1949 (T.
644). To that Complaint, a Motion to Quash was filed on
behalf of the Defendants and Respondents.
That on the 12th day of September, 1949, one Dominick Burns, Deputy Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, stated that he served the Complaint on Howard
J. Williams, the last President. So the Deputy Sheriff
had served Wendell Allen, as the President in the Dastrup case, on November 19, 1948 (T. 616), Howard J.
Williams, last president in the Employers case, on September 12, 1949 (T. 835), and Howard J. Williams, in
the Dastrup case, on S-eptember 12, 1949 (T. 666). In
each of the cases, a Motion to Quash was made, but in the
Employers case, (T. 828) the Motion was overruled (T.
839), and in the Dastrup case ( T. 626-653) the Motion
was overruled ( T. 669).
It is and was, the contention of the respondents, that
the Plaintiffs could not choose Mr. Williams in the Employers case, as the President, and the subject of their
service, and Wen dell Allen in the Dastrup case, as the
President, and the subject of their service, and on the
Amended Complaint, Mr. Howard J. Williams as the object of their service. And this, without any showing that
these were the officers of the said corporation. That at
Transcript 578, the Defendants' Attorney introduced
a Verification showing H. J. Williams to be Secretary
and Manager, and wherein, the Witness, called for the
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Defendants, na1ned 0. C. Allen, testified that he was the
President of the Con1pany on August·23, 1946 (T. 582).
So that the facts show that 0. C. Allen was the President
and not Mr. Wendell Allen or Mr. Williams. And see

T. 23.
That in any event, the said corporation had been dissolved at the time that service was attempted to be made.
It having been dissolved December 31, 1947 (T. 630).
That the original action on behalf of the Dastrups was
begun . .~pril 7, 1947, and was dismissed January 23, 1948.
The Complaint in the Dastrup case was amended
(T. 641-644), and at the end of the trial was further
amended over objection of Respondents.
The original Complaint charged, in general, negligence on the part of the Defendants, in failing to place the
nozzle o! the hose from the tanker, within the hole of the
intake to the tanks, and permitting gasoline to spray
over the surrounding surface and causing a fire hazard.
That the tank of the Plaintiffs was alleged to be
tilted, so that it could not be completely filled with gasoline without creating dangerous pockets for gaseous
fumes and static electricity, and that the Defendants
dropped a large, connecting iron onto the pavement,
which ignited the gasoline fumes (T. 608-611).
The Amended Complaint alleged that the day of
the delivery was a hot, summer day, and that the Defendant, Thoresen, knew that the tanks could not be completely filled with9ut creating in them dangerous pockets
for the accumulation of gaseous fumes and static electricity, and that the Defendants discharged heated gasoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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line from the tanker into the Plaintiffs' metal tanks,
caused the gasoline to overflow onto the heated cement
and caused gasoline fumes to accumulate in the tanks and
about the surface of the ground surrounding the premises, and as the proximate cause of the negligence of the
Defendants, an explosion and fire occurred (T. 642).
Negligence of the Defendants was enumerated (T. 643),
which was to the same effect, concerning the one tank,
and the spilling of the gasoline and the creation of the
dangerous pockets for gaseous fumes and static electricity in one of the tanks, and the dropping of the large,
1netal connecting iron, and the leaving of the tanker and
permitting the overflow of the tank, and the failure to
have a fire extinguisher on the tank. The amendment,
after trial, at (T. 705), amended Part 4. (T. 643) of the
allegations of negligence, by stating that the Defendants,
knowing the gaseous fumes from the gasoline filled the
atmosphere and the surface of the ground surrounding
the tanker, carelessly and negligently, dropped a large,
metal coupling or iron wrench onto a gravel surface, or
twisted the iron nozzle in the iron intake pipe, or allowed
static electricity to accumulate on the tanker, causing a
spark which ignited the gasoline fumes. It must be remembered that this was the theory upon which the Plaintiffs tried their case. That in the Amended Co1nplaint
(T. 641-642), it was apparent that the theory was that
the gasoline in the tanker was hot, and the gasoline in
there was discharged into a tank of cool gasoline, and
this caused gasoline fumes to accumulate in the tanks
and about the surface of the ground, and as a direct reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sult and proxin1ate cause of the negligence of the Defendants, an explosion and fire occurred. That was the theory
upon 'vhich the case 'Yas tried, even though specific allegations of negligence were set out in the Complaint
(T. 64:3). And another theory was that the dropping of
the wrench created a spark which ignited the gasoline
fumes, or the overflowing of one of the tanks started
static electricity which caused the spark.
The two cases were combined for trial only (T. 4-5).
But the Court stated that the same allegations of negligence and the san1e claim of contributory negligence applies in both cases ( T. 4:). The case proceeded to trial
before a jury, on October 16, 1950, and was terminated
on October 21, 1950. This was a long trial, involving a
good many witnesses. Many witnesses testified, and
much testimony was elicited from experts by both the
Plaintiffs and the Defendants, Respondents here.
(b)

WITNESSES AND TESTIMONY

La Forge Dastrup, one of the witnesses for the Plaintiffs, testified (T. 13-14, et seq.) that Defendants' Exhibit
"1" shows generally the location of the garage and storeroom, the air compressor and air compressor room and
the tanks and pumps, and at Transcript 778, 779, 780, 781
and 782, there is a drawing taken from the blackboard,
as to the facts the witnesses pointed out.
Mr. Dastrup ordered the gasoline (T. 24) and didn't
order a specified amount and was not at the premises
when the fire occurred.
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The pumps were 18 feet South of the front entrance
of the store, and there was a concrete floor between them
and the store. That that ·concrete was 24 inches in the
front and 12 inches on the South side. Tha.t this concrete
block was 16 feet by 18 feet. That there was an island
upon which the pumps sat, which was about 3 feet wide
and 12 feet long, and 5 or 6 inches higher than the cement
and 7 or 8 inches higher than the ground (T. 85). That
he said previously when deliveries of gasoline were made,
it slobbered a little gasoline out of the intake (T. 121).
That each pump was connected to a tank and that the
tanks were underneath this cement floor in a basement,
and that the tanks were held on cradles in that basement.
That the East tank was a 1200 gallon tank, about 14 feet
long. That the installation was made in the early part
of the Spring of 1946. That a pipe was taken from the
North end of the tank and run up to the pump through a
7 inch hole through a swing joint and attached to the
pump. That the swing joint was attached to the pump
in each of the three cases. That there was another floor
under the concrete and the 7 inch pipe was fastened on
to this wood, and ran up through the thickness of the island, and cement was poured around it (T. 14-16). There
was also a connection to the tank which was called an
intake pipe. This ran through the island to the tank (T.
17). That in the case of the East tank, it was about 4
feet from the top of the tank to the top of the island, and
in the ca.se of the other tanks, it would be slightly different. That the 1200 gallon tank was vented through
a connection from the pipe coming from the 2500 gallon
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tank. The 2500 gallon tank being the center tank (T. 17).
That the t\YO tanks were vented on the same vent. That
the vent ran through the Northeast corner of the basement, up outside and up the front of the store, some 12
or 1-! feet above the ground. That it had a weather head
on the vent (T. 17). That the vent from the center tank
'vas an inch pipe, and ran to a T on the 1200 gallon tank,
and it was an inch and a quarter from there to the outside (T. 18). That all of the pumps were operated by
electric motors and operated by a hand crank that made
the contact, which hand crank rolled the computers back
to zero and sets the switch, so when you take the nozzle
down from the pump, you just pull a little flat piece of
metal out. That p·uts the motor in contact with the power,
and that motor turns a drive belt that pulls the pump,
and that was the way each of these pumps were operated
(T. 19). That there was an entrance into the basement
from the compressor room (T. 19-20). That the door between the compressor room and the vault could be opened
and was, frequently, as the Plaintiff went into the vault
(T. 20). That this door was wooden (T. 20-21). That the
plaintiff had made an inspection of the room about two
weeks before the 23rd of August, 1946 (T. 21). That the
compressor in the compressor room was an automatic
compressor (T. 22). That it kicked on with a pressure
switch (T. 22). The vault room was high enough for an
ordinary man to walk around in, approximately 7 or 8
feet high ( T. 83). That the compressor was moved from
the store building to the basement in the Spring of 1946
(T. 85). That before the Plaintiff built the vault, he had
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the tanks buried in the ground with earth and sand and
gravel covering them (T. 90), and that he built the vault
because he thought he was having leaks (T. 91). That
when he dug the tanks up, they were three or four years
old (T. 90). That the center tank, when it was taken up,
had a hole in it and that Mr. Dastrup got some "Smoothon" with which he filled the hole to prevent it leaking
gasoline or gas vapors (T. 91). Mr. Thoresen made one
delivery before the fire ( T. 96). That the island was
about five or six inches higher than the cement level, and
possibly seven or eight inches higher than the concrete
level on the North and on the South (T. 85), Defendants'
Exhibit "1,'' referred to before ( T. 94-95). He testified.
that the Easterly tank had water in it as a result of
fighting the fire. That the center tank was all black inside and that it was ruptured near the end of the tank
for about six or seven inches, by one-half inch wide (T.
103). He further testified there was a hole inside the
store, over this room where the compressor was (T.
105), and that it was a hole 6 by 8 feet, about the size of
the compressor room, and the floor dropped right down
into the compressor room. It was a concrete floor (T.
105). That Plaintiffs' Exhibit "A" was a nozzle that sat
in the fill pipe (T. 120). That in the original Complaint,
nothing was said about a wrench dropping (T. 123). That
the height of the vault was 10 feet (T. 128). That the
center tank was burned on the inside and the rest were
burned on the outside over the top (T. 133), but that gasoline was pumped out of some of the tanks (T. 133). That
although Mr. Dastrup testified that there was no chain
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on the tanker that he saw in the yard, ( T. 133), he didn't
see the tractor 'Yhich hauls the tanker. The temperature
in the vault 'Yould be from sixty to eighty degrees (T.
149), and in . A. ugust, he would guess it at seventy degrees
(T. 86). That the fill pipes were four inch pipes (T. 374375 ), and the Plaintiff reiterated again that the fill pipes
were four inches in diameter (T. 391). That Exhibit "A"
,v·as sticking in the fill pipe when Mr. Dastrup saw it (T.
26), and that the size of it was approximately two inche::;
or two and one-half inches (T. 27). He further testified
(T. 60), that the pipe that drew the gasoline from the
tank into the pump, had to run about twelve feet along
the top of the tank to the pump, and up through the
seven inch housing hose connected to the tank by a reducer, and that the foot valve which hangs down in the
gasoline is full all the time ( T. 61), and that the pipe
from the reducer has an elbow on it just as it comes out
of the tank, and it makes a turn, and it would. be about
eight inches to two feet off the tank, and that the distance
from the top of the island to the top of the tank was about
four feet (T. 61).
The Plaintiffs called Kenneth Thoresen, one of the
Defendants, to the stand. Mr. Thoresen testified that the
gas flowing from the tanker into the storage tanks was
at the rate of about fifty gallons a minute (T. 284).
Mrs. Dastrup testified on her deposition, and was
asked about it further in this trial, if she hadn't said that
she had heard the compressor go on and off during the
time this explosion occurred, and she had answered "yes"
in her deposition (T. 341), but that the reporter was in
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error if he said she answered "yes." But that she admitted that she had been sworn by Mr. Barlow to tell the
truth on the day her deposition was taken (T. 347). That
it was stipulated by and between counsel for the Plaintiffs and Defendants that the deposition of Flora Dastrup, taken on October 3, 1950, which was referred to in
the question, was taken before Simon Barlow, a Notary
Public, and certified to by him, as shown by his Certificate, to be a full, true and correct transcript of the testimony and answer given by the said Flora Dastrup. As
to her statement that she first saw the fire in the basement (T. 345), and that the fire came from the basement
(T. 178), and that the accident occurred about 3:15P.M.,
3:45 P.M., being accurate, see Transcript 345. In that
connection, it is interesting to note that the points used
in the compressor are an electricity conductor (T. 80),
and when they close, they start up a little motor, and that
a single phase motor is a brush type motor, and that it
whirls around sufficiently to start the bigger wheels.
That the fuse box was in the same room as the compressor and this room was near the vault where the gasoline tanks were ; and there was a hole that leads between
the compressor room and the vault (T. 80). In that connection, Mr. Wilson, Attorney for the Plaintiffs, asked
Mr. Allred, a witness for the defense, this question, and
received the answer as follows: (T. 83).

"Q. Mr. Allred, the installations you made were
p·roperly made, were they not~
A. They were soldered."
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.A.nd the Plaintiff asked as to the prescribed regulations
(T. 83). He further testified as to the points closing and
starting the n1otor of the co1npressor (T. 80). That he
put a line to the true fuse switch, then to the pressure
switch on the co1npressor (T. 79).
Continuing further, the general condition of the receptaele6, and their position vvithin the vault, and the installations connected therewith, Leland Stevenson, called
for the Plaintiffs, testified and made a drawing of the
situation, \vhich has been heretofore referred to ( T. 136137). The vritness testified that there were some openings into the tanks besides the vents, by answering as
follows:
"A.

There was some openings going down from
underneath here, into the deal here below,
whatever you call it, the basement.

And further, in answer to the question:

"Q.

Was there a pipe leading from each tank up
to the corresponding pump~
A. Yes. There was a pipe so you could see right
down through into this basement, on each
one of these pumps, about an eight inch pipe.
I don't know exactly what it was, six or five."
(T. 138).

In describing the general relation in the line to the pump,
he testified that there was a swing joint, and there was an intake opening into each tank (T. 139). He later on
amended his testimony regarding the openings in the
tanks, by stating, that by double holes on the North side,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
he means the vent, and the suction line going to the
pumps would be coming off right near each other, about
six inches apart, and they were on the North side (T.
140). And Mr. Stevenson was asked by Mr. Wilson (T.
143) whether the installation for the vents and the other
connections of those tanks were properly installed, and
over objection, the witness was permitted to answer that
they were (T. 144). He testified (T. 144-145) that the
intake pipe had three elbows. That it had to go over and
swing, and down into the tank, and that that was the fill
pipe he was talking about. That the pipe would go perpendicular for about two feet and then it would turn at
a right angle, then go another couple of feet, and then
it would turn on a swinging joint at a right angle, and go
directly into the tank. In talking about one tank, he said
that was the situation, but the rest of them went straight
in, as he recalled (T. 145). That would be all but the one
that was furtherest East.
That after the fire, Mr. Dastrup changed the set up
and buried the tanks, and didn't put them back in the
vault (T. 119).
Now proceeding to the testimony relating to this
delivery. It is well to note Mrs. Dastrup's testimony,
that she and her son and Mr. Thoresen put sticks into the
tanks to determine how much gasoline there was in each
tank, and that she gave instructions to her son to check
the compartments in the tanker to see that they were full,
and to see that they were completely empty before the
man would drive away (T. 343-344). There was a conflict of Mrs. Dastrup's remembrance of what she had
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testified to on her deposition, but that she admitted that
she could have testified that the fire started in the West
tank, and that the first fire she saw was down in the
basement (T. 345).
:Jir. Thoresen testified that the hose had been connected to the ·\Vest tank, the No. 3 tank (T. 3'83-384). It
,yas ~Irs. Dastrup "~ho instructed Thoresen where to put
the gas (T. 395). Mr. Thoresen, the only one who made
a positive statement concerning the drag chains, testified that there were two drag chains on this trailer ( T.
394). That his load of gasoline consisted of 3245 gallons,
and that 915 gallons was "\vhite gas (T. 395). That white
gasoline \vent into the East tanks and the bronze into the
center tanks (T. 396). That Thoresen was standing right
there when he was filling tank No. 2, so as to shut off
the gasoline when the tank filled up, and that he shut it
off (T. 397). That there may have been some gasoline
spilled, but there was not a great amount of gasoline
spilled (T. 398 and 412). That after that was filled, he
placed the hose into the West tank, where he had been
instructed to put the balance of the gasoline (T. 398).
That there was only about forty or fifty gallons left at
that time. That he went to the truck to get his invoices
and book, and then went into the store to get Mrs. Dastrup to sign them (T. 398). Neal Dastrup got off the tank
and told him the trailer was empty (T. 399). That after
he had his receipts signed, he went out to the truck, and
the last compartment was empty and he disconnected
the hose and was replacing the three safety caps at the
time the explosion occurred (T. 399-400). That the caps
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were bronze (T. 400). That he heard the pun1p start up
(T. 401). That he wasn't burned at all, nor did he see
any flash of fire (T. 402). That he used a fire extinguisher on a blaze that was erupting from the broken concrete,
and that the pickup seemed to be burning (T. 403). That
it appeared that a fill pipe had severed, and a flame was
coming out of it (T. 404). That at first it was a small
flame from the top of the tank toward the center. That
the same flames seemed to be getting larger all the time,
like a blow-torch (T. 405-406). That he at no time dropped
a wrench (T. 407). That it would take approximately 2,280 to 2,290 gallons to fill the center tank (T. 408). That
he had 2330 gallons of Bronze on his tanker (T. 409).
Mr. Neal Dastrup testified that he was at the place
when the delivery was made (T. 150), and that Mr. Thoresen arrived at about 2 :00 o'clock in the afternoon (T. 150151). That he had been instructed to check the tanker to
see if the compartments were full and he did that. He
went up the back of the tanker where there is stairs, and
checked the marks inside the tanker in each compartment
(T. 151). Mr. Thoresen connected the hose to the tanker.
He opened the valve to dump the gas, and as soon as the
East tank was full, he changed and began dum•ping in
the center tank (T. 152). That Thoresen went into the
store to make out his bill, and Neal Dastrup stayed on
the outside on top of the tanker (T. 153). That he could
hear the air coming out and the gas started to overflow
and came out on the ground, and he hollered at him and
said, "your gas is running over." That Thoresen ran
out and shut the gas off, and Neal went in the store (T.
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15-±). '"rhat he sa'v l\Ir. Cox on the outside, and that the
R.E.A. truck had driven up (T. 155). That after he went
into the store, he sat down on some booths, and all of a
sudden he heard an explosion, and that was a very short
tune after Mr. Thoresen had run out (T. 155). That on
cross exan1ination, however, he testified that he went in
the store to Inake out the bill for the gasoline for Mr. Cox
(T. 157). That he stayed up on the tanker until Mr.
Thoresen got there to turn off the gas that was overflowing on the ground (T. 158). That it was about twenty
minutes after Thoresen arrived that Neal got off the
tanker. The measurements \vere taken of the amount of
gas in the tanks by Mr. Thoresen and Mrs. Dastrup and
Xeal Dastrup (T. 158-159). That he stayed up on the
tanker to see that the tanks were empty ( T. 159). And
yet, he testified, on cross examination, that it took twenty
minutes to run the gasoline out of the tanker into the
No.1 tank (T. 161). He also says that he went into the
store because the mail had come (T. 163). At the time he
went in the store, he didn't go in to make a bill out for
~fr. Cox, or to tell Thoresen his tanker was overflowing
(T. 163), but he went in there to read the paper and the
letter he had gotten from his father (T. 163). That he
stayed in the store until the explosion. His testimony
shows that he is not certain about a great deal of the
things that happened, and as to the time that the gas had
been running in tank No. 2, when he got off the tanker
(T. 165), he thought he was in the store about two minutes when the explosion occurred (T. 165). That as soon
as he saw the gas overflowing, he didn't run right in the
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store, but he called Mr. Thoresen's attention to it, and
that Neal was still on t'op of the tanker when Thoresen
shut off the gas (T. 158). That it was about two and onehalf Ininutes from the time that he saw the gas start
to spill, to when the explosion occurred (T. 166).
Mrs. Dastrup testified (T. 168-169) about the measurement and capacity of the tanks. That the first tank
was a new tank and that she had cautioned him not to
overflow this tank ( T. 169), and that there wouldn't be
room for all the gas in the center tank (T. 169). That
neither tank No. 2 or No. 3 were filled and she told Mr.
Thoresen to put the Bronze gas in No. 2 and No. 3 (T.
174). In tank No. 2, there was about 1800 gallons, and it
would hold 2500 gallons (T. 176). That tank No. 3 held
3500 gallons and she did not remember how many gallons
were in that tank (T. 176). That they were planning on
putting about 1800 gallons in tank No.3 (T. 177). That
she wa~ited until he started to run the gas into the white
tank, and then she went back into the store (T. 169), and
Mr. Thoresen came into the store and made out the bill
for the gas. He bought some cup cakes and things from
the counter (T. 170). That she heard Neal call Mr. Thoresen to tell him the gas was overflowing. That Neal was
on the tanker at that time (T. 170). It was right after
that that she heard the explosion (T. 175). The smoke
was coming up from underneath these blocks and around
the center tank (T. 171), and that there were several fire
extinguishers used in an attempt to put out the fire (T.
173), even though she testified that Mr. Thoresen said
he did not have a fire extinguisher (T. 170). That her
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son caine, took the newspaper and went and sat down
in one of the booths, and it was almost immediately after
that that the explosion took place (T. 179).
That Lorraine, an older sister of Neal, who was in
the store at the tin1e of the explosion, was not called as a
witness, although in Duchesne County at the time of the
trial (T. 59).
The testimony of Dean Cox, a witness on behalf of
the Plaintiffs, was to the effect that he was the Manager
of the :Jioon Lake Electric Association, and that he was
at the premises of the Dastrups when the fire occurred.
That he had gone there in a pickup truck and the car was
damaged (T. 323). That he had a torn finger and two
broken ribs as a result of the explosion (T. 324). That
he \Vas filling his gasoline tank when the explosion occurred (T. 328). That he was blown into the air and landed on top of the gasoline tanker, and the Studebaker
truck was blown into the air (T. 328). He states that
he came into the service station shortly after 3 :00 o'clock
(T. 329). Mrs. Dastrup and Neal Dastrup testified that
Thoresen came to deliver the gasoline at approximately
2 :00 or 2 :30 o'clock ( T. 168). He said he w~s not in the
habit of driving in and waiting on himself, except when
Mr. Dastrup was sent to Ogden (T. 330). He said that
he didn't see Neal Dastrup there that day (T. 330). That
he drove up to the North side of the pumps and the tanker
was on the South side of the pumps. That he didn't notice
any gasoline being discharged from the tanker into the
tanks (T. 330). That he was obtaining the gasoline from
the center tank (T. 332). But after he was referred to
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a statement he had signed, dated September 4, 1946, he
remembered that he had stated that he was taking the
gasoline from the West tank (T. 332), and that he
thought that should be right (T. 333). He stated that
he was not smoking and the tank driver was not smoking
(T. 333). He stated that neither the motor in his car,
nor the motor in the tanker were running (T. 333). He
also admitted that he had made a statement, in the statement referred to as of September 4, 1946, that the filling
hose from the tanker was fastened to the inlet to the
Ethyl, the far West tank (T. 333). That he admitted the
statement read to him (T. 335-336), was his statement
now.
The brother of the Plaintiff, LaForge Dastrup, testified that he had the center tank at his place (T. 189).
That the tank was ruptured in the vent pipe, near where
the top and the end come together (T. 189). That the
hole was in the North end (T. 190). That the rupture was
about six or seven inches long, and the width would be approximately an inch (T. 190). That he saw the pumps
lying over towards the South side of the island (T. 191).
He didn't know where the fire was coming from (T. 192).
After the fire got up to velocity, she was throwing fire
like a blow-torch, without the intake pipe (T. 192), and
that it was from the center tank. That he saw Exhibit
"A" in the fill pipe of the metal tank (T. 194).
Mrs. Edith Timothy, called on behalf of the Plaintiffs, testified that she didn't know where the fire was
coming from (T. 184). That the concrete blocks were
blown up in the air (T. 183).
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Mrs. LeRoy Thacker, a witness on behalf of the
Plaintiffs, testified that she saw the man under the car
co1ne out and go and drive the truck away, and that it was
the gas man (T. 186).
1Irs. Leora Oman, called as a witness by the Plaintiffs, testified (T. 198) that she was in the store when the
explosion took place.
Parley Lambert, called as a witness on behalf of the
Plaintiffs, testified that he saw a fire when he arrived
after the explosion (T. 201). That there was a fire coming up through the cracks in the cement, or else from the
vent, or both probably (T. 201). He observed the fire
getting bigger all the time, and it seems as though it got
so hot around the tanks, or at least out of the vent, was
where most of the fire was coming from, out of the vent
of the tank (T. 202). That it was the vent close by the
pump (T. 202). That the fire burned down in the basement about one-half hour before the store caught on fire
(T. 203). That the fire shot up in the air about 25 feet,
like a big blow-torch ( T. 204) .
Wesley Thacker, a witness for the Plaintiffs, testified that he heard an explosion when he was an eighth
of a mile from the store (T. 206).
Velma Fieldstead, a witness on behalf of the Plaintiffs, testified that she saw a gasoline tanker standing
by the Dastrups pump when she went in the store (T.
G9), 2-nd that it was in the afternoon, shortly after noon
(T. 68). That she stayed until the fire died down some
and "it seemed like they were quite encouraged of putting
it out, and then we went past the fire and got into a car"
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(T. 72-73). When she returned, she saw the fire in front
of the store (T. 73). That she saw the men trying to put
out the fire with dirt and fire extinguishers and they
were squirting them down through the cracks in the
cement (T. 76). That the man that she saw talking to
Mrs. Dastrup, was out there· before the explosi0n occurred ( T. 77).
As to the cause of the fire, Glen S. Anderson said
that the S.outh wall of the basement was intact (T. 418);
that the tanks we-re not blown open or disintegrated (T.
419); that he took gas out of the center, or middle tank
and one other tank (T. 422); that there is no motor on
the tanker; that the gasoline is discharged by gravity
( T. 422) ; that he had been transporting gasoline 12 or
13 years ( T. 423) ; that it is customary to discharge the
gasoline from nozzles that connect in to fill pi pes that protrude from the pipe (T. 423); that he has known gasoline
to be spilled when tanks are filled (T. 424); that the truck
had a fire extinguisher on it ( T. 434).
Willis J. Smith, Assistant Chief of the Salt Lake Fire
Department and Fire Marshall, gave as his opinion, that
the installation, which was depicted by Exhibit "1," and
given to him upon a hypothetical question, was not a safe
installation (T. 441).
Dewey H. Olsen, who had been in the oil and gas business 21 years (T. 444), testified that he was familiar
with regulations concerning safe installation and maintenance of gasoline containers (T. 445), and he gave
as his opinion, that the installation of the tanks, as described, did not comply with safe standards (T. 446-447).
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He testified, without objection, (T. 448), that the set
up and installation 'Yas not safe, as it would allow leaks,
and because the air compressor had two open switches
(T. ±-!S--!-!9), that 'vithout the right paste, made up specifically for gasoline, the installation by the plumber might
allo"~ leaks (T. -!51). Without objection, he testified that
it is not safe to install tanks without covering them fully,
so there is no air space (T. 442-443), and that such standards were general throughout the state (T. 454).
Lynn Jones testified that he worked for the Lang
Company, and that he Inade all types of storage tanks;
•
that he had been in the business for 16 years and was
familiar with installing and maintenance of storage tanks
(T. 459-461). He was of the opinion that the installation (T. 461-462), was a very hazardous installation, and
that the pumps shouldn't have been placed over the vault
with an opening directly into the vault, because the pump
leaks all the time and allows a little gasoline to drip (T.
463). Mr. Jones testified, without objection, that there
is always vapor inside the pump (T. 463); that the compressor sparks every single time it goes from the starting
winding to the running winding (T. 466); that there is a
spark, and the compressor motor is not safe unless incased in an explosion proof box (T. 466); that he did not
recommend putting "Smooth-on" in a hole in the tank
(T. 467); and that the "Smooth-on" would crack and
b:·eak by vibration (T. 467); and that it shouldn't be used
on gasoline tanks ( T. 468). On cross examination he
testified that the vapor could come from the pumps (T.
468). He said that in fifty per cent of the cases, comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pressor tanks start up even though someone isn't using
the air (T. 470).
Lynn Jones, recalled as a witness, testified concerning a compressor room with a compressor in it, and that it
is necessary to have air for a compressor to operatB (T.
473-474); and that the compressor would operate only as
long as it had air, and then it would just quit pumping air,
and if the outside door to the compressor was shut, there
would have to be some source of air for the compressor
to operate (T. 47 4).
The Plaintiffs introduced several 'expert witnesses
and the Defendants introduced several expert witnesses.
The testimony of Melvin A. Cook called on behalf
of the Defendants, is thorough, scientific and objective.
l-Ie testified that a spark, igniting gasoline vapor and
air mixture, in the explosive range, would produce a
flame. That the ignition of the gasoline, which was alleged to have been spilled on the ground or concrete
would have produced a visible flame (T. 478), and that
anyone exposed directly to such a flame would be severely burned. In answer to the hypothetical question (T.
479-489), he said that the chain of circumstances, as dis-closed by the question, would be utterly impossible (T.
481), and he states that Mr. Thoresen and Mr. Cox would
have been burned if the ignition had happened as the
Plaintiffs contended happened (T. 483). That the explosion originated somewhere else than on the surface (T.
483). That the explosion occurred also in the compressor
room ( T. 484-485). That the spillage of the gasoline had
nothing whatever to do with the explosion (T. 487). That
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the accmnulation in the vapor state, 8ufficient to cause
the explosive mixture, would not occur in two to two
and one-half 1ninutes (T. -±88). That this would not
occur, eyen though you poured gasoline through the storage pipe 'vith a turbulent stream. That it would take
about three or four days at least to vaporize the vault
(T. 490). That the compressor would draw in air, if the
outside door of the con1pressor room were closed, and
that "Tould pull air down through the vents, but that
'vould still not make it as short as two to two and one-half
minutes (T. 490-491). It "\vould take at least several hours
. (T. 491). That there was a possibility of ignition in the
pumps ( T. 491). That the dropping of a wrench is very
unlikely to produce an explosion (T. 491). That it would
take one and one-half gallons in the vapor stage, distributed throughout the vault, to make an explosive mixture
in this vault (T. 498-499). That the conditions that occurred, vvould not occur, if the vapor had not co1npletely
filled the vault (T. 500). That if 40 or 50 gallons had
flowed down into the vault, that would not immediately
become an explosive air mixture, and that this vaporization could not occur in two and one-half minutes (T. 501),
and that to get the condition, it would be a day or several
days before it would get the equilibrium condition (T.
501). He testified, (T. 502), that the scraping of the fill
pipe would not have caused the explosion, and the static
from the truck would not have caused the explosion. That
the static electricity would all have been discharged (T.
502-503). It was the opinion of Dr. Cook (T. 504), that
because of the acts of the driver of the truck, in getting
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on and off the truck, there would be no static on the truck
after those things happened. Dr. Cook stated (T. 507),
that in his opinion, the spark from the compressor was
the cause of the ignition of the vapor. That some condition n1ay exist in the gasoline pump, which would have
caused the spark (T. 510).
As to the contributory negligence of Dean Cox (T.
516-517), Dr. Cook gave it as his opinion, the slopping
of gasoline on the manifold could have caused the ignition of the fire that was set under the hood of the pickup
truck.
Dr. Cook (T. 520), shows that the spilling of gasoline
on the surface of the ground would not cause this fire,
because he can see no way that the gasoline would have
gone into the vault, because the holes down into the vault
were under the tank housing (T. 521).
Dr. Lorin C. Bryner, professor of Chemistry at Brigham Young University, testified that he was familiar
with the set up and operation of service stations (T. 523),
and in answer to a hypothetical question, he said that
he did not believe the dropping of the wrench caused
the spark that ignited the gasoline vapor (T. 529), and
that if it had, there would have been a big flash (T. 529530), and that the person who was around the gasoline,
would have been engulfed in the flame (T. 530). Dr.
Bryner, also said that with regard to the holes in the
vault, and the gasoline vapors that would accumulate in
the pump, they would naturally go down through the hole
in the island (T. 531). That the air compressor would
suck the gasoline vapors into the comp,ressor room from
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the vault (T. 53:2). That it would be an unsafe operation
to have an air co1npressor near the vault ( T. 535). That
a considerable a1nount of gasoline could not, in two and
one-half Ininutes, generate vapors which would cause an
explosion in the vault (T. 539). That it would take at
least ten or fifteen minutes (T. 539). "I'd estimate it at
least fifteen minutes" (T. 541). That a static from
motors "\Yould ignite gasoline (T. 542-543), and that the
arcing, "~hen the electric apparatus went on, would ignite
the gasoline (T. 5-13). That the discharge of static electricity from the truck would be complete when the operator stepped down from the truck and walked around and
touched it with his hands (T. 544). That you would have
to have a direct and continuation of the flame, or something at 495° Fahrenheit, to ignite the gasoline down
there, and that you would have direct contact with the
gasoline that was spilled (T. 546). That even though
there 'vas a flame on the outside, it wouldn't penetrate
under the base of the tank (T. 548). That the witness
had poured gasoline on a rock and used a steel spring
to make sparks, and he could see the sparks jumping,
but the gasoline didn't ignite (T. 550). That you couldn't
get sparks enough from the fall of a wrench, as described
to ignite the gasoline (T. 551). That you would get a lot
of vapor out of your tanks as you were filling them (T.
553). That he doubted there would be very little vapor
go down into the holes under the pumps (T. 556). That
if the gasoline that was evaporated on the surface, did
have a higher temperature, it wouldn't go down, it would
be lighter and it would go up (T. 558). That the gasoline
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in the tanker, even though it was driven as stated, would
not be over five degrees hotter than the gasoline in the
underground tanks (T. 559). That it would take longer
than fifteen minutes for the gasoline to vaporize in the
vault (T. 565). It would take an hour or more (T. 565).
That he had 1nade experiments, the morning of the testimony, with Dr. Cook (T. 566). That there was a possibility that the compressor ignited the gasoline (T. 566).
That you couldn't have tanks in that vault without getting
vapors in there all of the time ( T. 568).
In the testimony of L. W. Pierce, he said that the
tanks were whole (T. 570), and that the wall between the
vault and the compressor room was in good condition
(T. 570).
La F'orge Dastrup testified that the hole in the tank
that was covered with "Smooth-on" was about two-thirds
of the way around toward the top, and was near the top
(T. 381). That the elbow end of Exhibit "A," which was
found stuck in the fill pipe, was facing South, and the
question was asked as to whether it had a bronze collar
on it, and the witnes·s, La Forge Dastrup, did not indicate dissent with that in his answer (T. 387). La Forge
Dastrup further testified ( T. 388), that there was a multibreaker on the switch which supplied the electric current
to the air compressor, and that it was supposed to. kick
out, if there was an overload current (T. 388-389).
Dr. Broadbent testified that gasoline in contact with
the air, will burn on the surface ( T. 209). That it would
take a spark of over 1,000 degrees to ignite the gasoline
(T. 210). In answer to the hypothetical question, Dr.
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Broadbent testified (T. :217), there are certainly some
possibilities or probabilities of what Inight have happened
on that basis, and that any kind of a flame or spark,
either occurring in the cha1nber, or carried into the chamber, could cause an explosion (T. 218). As to the sp·ark
by the dropping of iron, he gives in his opinion, that it
could be a possibility, and states, that when you have a
n1edium of gasoline and air, it will not explode if there
is no other element in it (T. 221). In giving the basis of
his opinion, it will be noted that Dr. Broadbent assumed
that the gasoline was flowing down through the seven
inch hole in the top of the island for approximately two
and one-half minutes (T. 232). That the witness had not
investigated any commercial explosions (T. 237), and
that he was not an explosive ~xpert (T. 238). That the
spark you get from a leather belt is a static spark (T.
240), and the brush of an electrically driven motor would
give off an electric spark (T. 241). That the dropping
of a wrench would produce a flame which would be visible
(T. 243), and he admitted that the minimum, which he
described, for this ignition to have occurred outdoors,
would have to be ideally conditioned, and he didn't think
it was (T. 246), and that anybody standing near where
the ignition occurred would be burned (T. 247). His opinion was based upon the fact that there was a turbulent
flow of gasoline from the ·tank into the vault (T. 250).
If gasoline "\vere spilled outside in a pool, you wouldn't
have vaporization sufficient to fill that vault in two
minutes (T. 251). The witness stated that vapor flowing
down a seven inch pipe would not create a combustible
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34
ignitable material in the basement in two minutes (T.
251), and he reiterates again, to substantiate his theory,
you must have gasoline flowing, in a turbulent manner,
down the seven inch stove pip·e (T. 252). That if the
tank was filled with gasoline, it would not blow up from
an internal explosion (T. 253-254). He admits that if he
had a pool of gasoline setting on the floor of the vault, it
would take at least an hour to fill that completely, without convection currents ( T. 255), and it would take at
least ten gallons to completely vaporize for an explosive
1nixture in two hours (T. 256), and that he did not state
how much gasoline, standing still, it would take to vaporize uniformly throughout the vault in less than two minutes ti1ne, and that in two minutes, you wouldn't have
enough diffusion to fill the remaining space with combustible mixture, if you had the vault half full of gasoline,
with no turbulence (T. 259-260). He reiterated again in
his testimony (T. 267), that he assumed that the liquid
ran down the hole, and he admits that in any event, five
or ten minutes would be the shortest time it could diffuse
to make an explosive medium in the vault (T. 268). But
that he believes that one-fifth of the volume of vault could
be filled with combustible material and give the result
of the explosion (T. 269), and he assumed that the gasoline ran for two and one-half minutes and 100 gallons
were spilled (T. 271), and he assumes that there was at
least a couple of gallons that flowed down in the hole
(T. 272). He assumed that the wrench fell, saying it was
his invention (T. 273), and he assumed that it fell from
a height of thirty inches (T. 274), and that the spark
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
could have conte fron1 other sources ( T. 27 4). As to the
grating of the intake and the nozzle, he said it is a possibility, but not very probable (T. 275), and he reiterated
this again ( T. 278-279).
Dr. Gardner testified on behalf of the Plaintiffs, that
a spark or heated surface was required to set off the explosion (T. 297). He stated that it was possible that the
source of the spark would be the grating of the nozzle
in the intake ( T. 298). The evidence shows that insertion
had been made long prior to the explosion. He also said
that there \Yas a second possible source, which was the
wrench dropping (T. 299). He stated that there might
haYe been a spark from the tanker, but in view of the
positive evidence that this was grounded, this is another
possibility (T. 301). He said that there was another
source of the spark: A gentleman was filling his tank
with gasoline at the time of the explosion, and there were
feet in n1otion at that time, and it is very likely that a
nail on the man's shoe, against the concrete, might have
created the spark (T. 302), and this is interesting in view
of the contributory negligence of Cox. He states that the
equipment found on the gravel, he supposed was brass
or bronze, and it wasn't p~rticularly likely that this would
cause a spark upon contact with the gravel (T. 303). That
he wasn't an explosive expert (T. 304). He admitted
that static may or may not have been discharged from
·L~:e truck (T. 307). He admits that is a speculative matter
(T. 310). He admits that he was conjectural in his theory
(T. 313), and that one of the people who might have
caused a spark was the person who drove in to fill his
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tank with gasoline ( T. 313), and that the son of Mr.
Dastrup might have caused the spark (T. 313). That the
question as to whether or not a spark would produce an
explosion is very involved ( T. 315). He didn't know
where the spark came from (T. 316-317). That the discharge of the static from the tanker could have happened
in other ways than by drag chains (T. 318). That the
housing of the pumps could have produced the spark
(T. 321-322).
(c)

MOTIONS

That after the Plaintiffs rested (T. 364-365), the Defendants moved the Court to dismiss the action against
the Allen Oil Company and Kenneth Thoresen, on the
grounds stated therein. Motion to Dismiss was denied
(T. 366). The Motion to Dismiss was amended (T. 425),
and the Court discussed the question of jurisdiction (T.
426), but did not grant the Motion. After the conclusion
of the case, the Defendants made a Motion for a directed
verdict ( T. 587-589). The Motions were denied.
ARGUMENT
POINTS -TO BE RELIED ON:

POINT NO. I.
SERVICE ALLEGED TO BE MADE UPON PRESIDENT WAS IN ERROR, AND MOTIONS TO QUASH
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

Respondents made a request for additional designation of Record on Appeal for the purpose of considerSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing other and additional Inatters than those raised by
.A.ppellants (T. 815 ). These \vere the Motions to Quash
(T. 6~6, 653 and 655), and the Ruling by the Court (T.
669), all in case No. 2-l-94, \vhich is No. 7734 before this
Court, and the ~lotion to Quash (T. 828), and the Ruling
by the Court thereon (T. 839), all in case No. 2551,
which is case No. 7733 before this Court. That the
facts relating to this nlotion are found at pages 7, 8 and 9
of the Statement of Facts, and it is and was the contention of the Respondents that the service was not
properly made on the officers upon whon1 the service
was attempted to be made, and the Motions to Quash
should have been granted.
The ~lotions to Quash referred to, for which the
Transcript numbers are given in both cases, further set
out, that since the corporation was dissolved at the time
service was attempted to be made, there was no service
upon Allen Oil Company, nor could the Allen Oil Company have such an action brought against it. The original action on behalf of the Dastrups was begun April 7,
1947, and was dismissed January 23, 1948. The corporation had been dissolved December 31, 1947. The law in
effect at the time of the dissolution of the Allen Oil
Company was Chapter 25, Laws of Utah, 1945, which
amended Section 104-62-6, UCA, 1943. No objection
was made by the Plaintiffs, Dastrup, to the dissolution
of the corporation, although the Findings of Fact and
Decree (T. 629-630) state that notice was given in the
Deseret News, and the time was set for hearing. In fact,
the case of Dastrup vs. Allen Oil Company was pending
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and was dismissed after the dissolution. It is the contention of the Respondents that the provisions of Section
18-1-2, UCA 1943, as amended by Chapter 30, Laws of
Utah, 1945, do not permit the action by the said Dastrup.
See Platz vs. International Smelting Co., 61
U. 342, 213 P. 187.
In that respect, see the statement of the trial Court
(T. 422-426). The Motions to Quash should have been
granted.
See Crossman vs. Vivienda Water Con1pany,
89 P. 335;
Madson vs. Kennecott Mines, 171 P. 1040;
Fletcher's Cyclopedia, Corporations, Vol. 16,
page 892.
POINT NO. II.
THE MOTION TO DISMISS, WHICH WAS FILED
BY THESE RESPONDENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH WAS
DENIED BY THE SUPREME COURT, BUT RESPONDENTS R.ENEW SAID MOTION, IN VIEW
OF THE CASE OF: Holten vs. Holten, 243 P. 2d. 438
-Utah.

In the case before the Court, the Respondents moved
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah to dismiss the
Appeal of the Plaintiffs, Employers Mutual Liability
Insurance Company, Case No. 7733, on the ground and
for the reason that the Record on Appeal was not filed
within the extended time granted by the Court, and that
no Bond was filed at the time of the :filing of the Notice
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of . .-\ppeal, and that said Bond had not been filed at the
time of the hearing of the Motion.
That on January 7, 1952, the Supreme Court notified
Respondents' counsel that it had denied the Motions
above ~et out and stated that the Appellants were required \Yithin ten days to file an Affidavit from the
Clerk of the District Court, and a proper Appeal Bond.
The _.:\_ffidaYit of the Clerk, filed in the matter, attempted
to explain the failllre ·to file the Record on Appeal, but
no explanation \Yas ever made as to why the Bond was
not filed. Since this Motion was made in both cases,
Xo. 7733 and No. 773-±, the Motion in case No. 7734
should have been granted on the failure to file the
Record on Appeal, and in the Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company case, No. 7733, the Motion
should have been granted, both on that ground and on
the failure to file the Undertaking, because, as stated
in Holten vs. Holten, reasons satisfactory to the Court
must be advanced to excuse the failure to file, and the
Record will show that there was no proper explanation
at all given as to why the Bond had not been filed.
Rule 73 (c) and Rule 73 (a), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The Motion was heard by not all of the Court, and
it is earnestly requested that the Court review this
ruling, in view of the late case of Holten vs. Holten,
supra.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40

POINT NO. III.
THE RESPONDENTS WILL SET OUT SERIATIM,
THE ANSWERS TO APPELLANTS' POINTS, AND
THE REASONS WHY THE RESPONDENTS CONTEND THAT SAID POINTS, AS STATED IN THE
ARGUMENT OF APPELLANTS' BRIEF, DO NOT
WARRANT A REVERSAL OF THIS MATTER.

ANSWER TO APPELLA.NTS' POINT NO. 1: As to
the testimony of V. C. Langford
It is the contention of the Appellants that the witness, V. C. Langford, should not have been allowed to
answer the question as to whether or not the set up of
the place, for the reception of gasoline was a place for
the storage of gasoline which would comply with safe
practice in the oil industry. Mr. Langford (T. 349-351)
qualified as an expert in the manufacture, distribution,
sale and storage of gasoline. The objection of Mr. Wilson, on behalf of the Appellants, is found at page 356
and page 357 of the Transcript. The basis of his objection was that the witness was not qualified to state such
an opinion, and that the answer would be incompetent,
irrelevant and immaterial, because there is no evidence
that that in any way contributed to what occurred. At
Transcript 357, Mr. Wilson added an objection. He
stated that he wished to preserve his Motion to Strike,
and also that the witness was asked for an ultimate
statement of fact which was invading the province of
the jury.
Mr. Stevenson was asked on behalf of the Plaintiff
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concerning the installation as to The connections being
proper according to the standards of plumbers (T. 1434). On cross exa1nination (T. 83), Mr. Wilson had also
asked ~fr. Allred the question about proper installation.
\Vithout objection, Dewey H. Olsen testified with regard
to the safety of the installation, and the only objection
n1ade \Yas a ~lotion to Strike on the ground that the
"Titness "~as assuming facts not in the Record (T. 448449).

But in any event, the evidence was proper and
within the purview of the pleadings. Also, the Plain tiffs
called ~fr. Stevenson, who testified, over objection, as
to the value of the Dastrup buildings. The an1ount that
the Plaintiffs, Dastrup, was entitled to be compensated
for \Vas testified to by Mr. Stevenson, and this was an
issue which the jury had to determine, so that the objection by Appellant, that a witness could not testify as
to a fact to be found by the jury, is not born out by
his own theory and actions in this case. But further than
that, it is stated in Section 817, Page 686, of 20 Am. J ur.,
that where the opinion of an expert is admitted upon the
ground that it concerns a matter of skill or science,
there is no invasion of the province of the jury, even
though the question calls for an opinion upon the question or one of the questions to be decided by the jury,
because the matter is one with which the jury is not
s1.1pposed to be competent to deal without the aid of
such opinion. And Section 819, page 689 of the same
work, where it is said, that competent and qualified
witnesses have often been permitted to state opinions
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relating to the dangerous character of places, machinery
and appliances, whenever the facts are such that inexperienced persons are likely to be incapable of forming
a correct judgment without such assistance.
S.ee Kennedy vs. Union Electric Co., 216 SW.
2d 756;
Ming vs. Jackson, 31 S. 2d 900, 146 A.L.R. 8.
The qualification of an expert witness, is a question
for the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling
will not be disturbed upon appeal, unless a clear abuse
of it is shown.
Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 561, page 641.
Commonwealth vs. Rouchie, 7 A. 2d, 102.
And where, as here, the ultimate issue to be determined by the jury, was one dependent upon the interpretation of certain scientific facts, beyond the experience
or knowledge of the ordinary man on a jury, a witness,
qualified, as to the subject matter involved, may express
an opinion.
20 Am. Jur., S·ec. 782, page 654;
32 Corpus Juris Secundum, Evidence, Sec. 534,
page 243;
Cropper vs. Titanium Pigment Co., 47 Fed. 2d
1038, 78 A.L.R. 737 ;.
Patrick vs. Smith, 134 P. 1076, 48 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 740;
Riche vs. Halverson, 272 NW. 591;
Creshman vs. Consolidated Products Co., 5
NW. 2d 646;
20 Am. J ur., Sec. 819, page 689, Evidence;
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Burnwell Coal Co. vs. Setzer, 67 S. 604 ·
Gila , ... alley, G. & N. R. Co. vs. Lyoff, 203' U.S.
465, 51 L. Ed. 276;
Grahan1 vs. Pennsylvania Co., 21 A. 151, 12
L.R._._-\.. 293 ;
Baltimore and Ohio R. Co. vs. Whitacre, 92
_._~. 1060;
Hayes vs. Southern Pacific Co1npany, 17 U. 99,
53 P. 1001.
In the case of Hayes vs. Southern Pacific Comparn.y,
17 l~. 99, 53 P. 1001, the question was asked:
QlTESTION: From your experience as a railroad
engineer and your experience as a civil engineer, please state whether those sheds were
carefully and properly built for the purposes
for \vhich they were erected~
Counsel for the Appellant insisted that admission of
this testimony was erroneous, because, as they maintain, it was calling for the opinion of the witness, on
a question that the jury was to determine, and the Court
quoted, with approval, from other cases, in holding that
the evidence was admissible and no error was committed.
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINT NO. II: AS
TO POINT NO. 2, RELATING TO THE TESTIMONY OF 0. C. ALLEN:
This was offered as rebuttal, as the Record will
show (T. 585). It will be noted that the question asked
Mr. 0. C. Allen was as to whether or not he knew of
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that condition on or prior to August 23, 1946. Previous
to that question, counsel had stated:
QUES.TION: Mr. Allen, directing your attention
to the fact that on the LaForge Dastrup
premises in Altamont there were certain
tanks, gasoline storage tanks, installed in an
underground, unfilled chamber. Did you know
of that condition on and prior to August 23,
1946~

Objection was made to the question on behalf of the
Defendant, Thoresen, on the ground that ifcouldn't bind
him as an individual, and that it was immaterial and incompetent. Objection was also made on behalf of Allen
Oil Company, that it was immaterial and irrelevant. The
Court stated:
THE COURT: I wonder if this question of
knowledge has anything to do with what we
have before us~
And the Court sustained the objection. ~1r. Wilson then
rested (T. 583). Now, in making the offer, Mr. Wilson
did not confine himself to the question asked, but stated
that he would offer to produce testimony to the effect
that while Mr. A1len was President of the Allen Oil
Company, and prior to August 23, 1946, he learned of
the installation of the tanks in the underground chamber,
as testified to in this case, and of the general installations
connected therein, and that he was aware of such conditions through information he had on the 23rd day of
August, 1946, and that he knew that the tanks on the
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Dastrup pre1nises, to 'Yhich gasoline 'vas delivered by
the Defendant, . .\llen Oil Con1pany, 'vere installed in an
open, underground rhan1ber on .A.ugust 23, 1946, at the
time of the deliYery of the gasoline in question. It will
be noted, that the question asked Mr. Allen, to which
objection '""Rs sustained, pertained only to the knowledge
of an installation in an underground, unfilled chamber,
or gasoline storage tanks, and the offer went way beyond
the question asked.
The Complaint, and the Amended Complaints of the
Plaintiffs stated that the Defendants knew the condition, construction, and capacity of· said storage tanks,
because the Defendant, Kenneth Thoresen, acting fox the
~-.: '·
6
Defendant, Allen Oil Company, had made re:Pe-t-ed previous deliveries of gasoline to the Plaintiff's p,remises, and
into the tanks, and knew said tanks could not be filled
without creating dangerous pockets for gaseous vapors
and static electricity (T. 609 and 642). There was never
any allegation that the Defendant, Allen Oil Company,
knevv the condition of the storage tanks because of the
knowledge of 0. C. Allen, but in any event, the allegation is not as to the fact the storage tanks were in an
underground, unfilled basement, but that the Defendants
knew the construction and capability of said storage
tanks, and that they could not be filled without creating
pockets. There was no allegation of any negligence
connected with the fact that the tanks were installed
in an open, underground chamber.
The Court, in its ruling, heretofore referred to, called
attention to the fact that the Plaintiffs could not withhold
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evidence which was necessary for its main case, and then
introduce it at the end of the Defendants' case. And in
that connection, it may be stated that as a general rule,
the party on whom the affirmative of an issue revolves,
is bound to give all his evidence in support of the issue
in the first instance, and will not be permitted to hold
back part of his evidence, confirmatory to his case, and
then offer it in rebuttal. Nor, as a general rule, will the
discretion of the trial Court in refusing to permit evidence in chief to be introduced in rebuttal, be interfered
with.
53 Am. J ur. Sec. 121, pages 107 and 108;
Workman v. Henry, 71 U. 400, 266 P. 1033;
6 Jones Commentary on Evidence, Second
Edition, Sec. 2526, 266 P. 1033, 58 A.L.R.
1346;
Malone v. Los Angeles Railway Corporation,
238 P. 110, 72 Cal. App. 736;
Lamance v. Byrnes, 30 P. 700;
Multnomah County v. Willamette Towing Co.,
89 P. 389.

And, in any event, the grounds for new trial enumerated
in Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are subject to
the provisions of Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
which states that errors and defects in evidence and in
any ruling or order, are not grounds for granting a new
trial unless it appears to the Court inconsistent with substantial justice.
Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 3, page 3288.
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The offer 1nade by llr. ''Tilson was not related to
either 1[r. Cox or ~lr. Dastrup, so if it was improper
on behalf of "J[r. Cox, that is in the En1ployers Mutual
Liability Insurance Co., rase No. 7733, and was not limited on behalf of the Dastrup·s, case No. 7734, then the
offer \Yas bad in part and should not have been admitted,
and since the offer 'vas bad as to Thoresen, the same rule
applies. The offer \Yasn't restricted on behalf of the
Dastrups, or as to the . .\llen Oil Company.
See To1nlinson v. Bean, 178 P. 2d 972;
:20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 263, page 253;
"Jlorris v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours Co., 129
A.L.R. 352;
.
Shepard v. Alden, 29 A.L.R.. 1094;
Lohsen v. Lawson, 95 A.L.R. 309;
53 Am. Jur., Sec. 140, page 924, Sec. 103, page
92, Sec. 99, page 88;
Lemcke v. A. L. Funk & Co., 139 P. 234, Ann.
cas. 1915 D. 23;
3 Am. Jur., Sec. 965, page 527;
Consolidated Ice Machine Co. v. Keifer, 25
NE 799, 10 L.R.A. 696;
20 Am. Jur., Sec. 264, page 253;
Close v. Stuyvesant, 24 NE 838, 3 L.R.A. 161,
163 A. 588.
And as said in 64 Corpus Juris, Sec. 153, Page 134-135:
~'While evidence may not be excluded where

offered against a party or parties for which it is
competent, when evidence is offered agai~st several parties and is admissible only as agamst some
parties the Court may reject it. It then becomes
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ticular parties who may be bound by it. Where
evidence is offered jointly, on behalf of several
parties, which is competent on behalf of some,
and incompetent as to others in whose behalf it is
offered, the trial court may reject it."
Thorne, et al v. Joy, et al, 47 P. 642;
Kincaid v. Chicago, R. I. & G. Railroad, 119
sw 2d 1084.
It will be noted that although at pages 12 and 16
of his Brief, Counsel makes an argument on the installation of the electric compressor, that Mr. Allen was not
asked regarding this at all, and it is true that the Plaintiffs relied only upon the fact that one tank was tilted,
and in this, Mr. Allen was not asked at all. On page 16 of
their Brief, the Appellants contend that the jury was
entitled to know that the Defendant, corporation, knew
of the existing conditions. This offer was not restricted
to the Defendant, corporation. Having once agreed to the
trial of the cases jointly, the burden is on the Plaintiffs
to point out where the evidence is proper, and against
which party it is proper. We submit that to have admitted testimony of Allen, on behalf of the Plaintiffs,
Dastrup would have been prejudicial error for the reason
that Dastrup cannot avail himself of his own negligence.
The allegation of the Plaintiffs that Allen Oil Company was a corporation, was denied. In order for the
knowledge of 0. C. Allen to bind the corporation, it would
be necessary that he be engaged in work on that line and
acting in the line of his duty, for his knowledge to be
binding upon the corporation.
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The declaration of the President, to be ad1nissible,
n1ust depend upon proof, aside fron1 his statement that
he learned about this situation, and it must show that
the officer was engaged in \vork and learned the facts
in line of his duty. The general rule is that knowledge
acquired, or possessed by an officer or agent of a corporation, other\vise than in the course of his employment,
or in relation to a n1atter which is not within the scope
of his authority, is not notice to the corporation. So
according to the weight of authority, the knowledge of
an officer of a corporation which comes to him through
his private transactions outside of the range of his official duties is not imputable to the corporation itself so
as to charge the corporation with constructive notice of
the information received by the officer.
Fletcher's Cyclopedia, Corporations, Vol. 3,
Chapter 11, Sec. 793, page 28 and 29 and 30;
The Victor Gold and Silver Mining Co., v.
The National Bank of the Republic, 15 U.
391, 49 P. 826;
Rudolph v. Farmers Supply Co., 128 SE 638;
Oliver v. Grand Ronde Grain Co., 142 P. 541;
Farmers Bank v. Saling, 54 P. 190.
The time when the former President of the Company was
alleged to have received the information, was not given,
and it may well have been received by him when he was
not President, and therefore, is not binding on the corporation.
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Fletchers' Cyclopedia, Corporations, Vol. 3,
Sec. 799, page 46 ;
Mendell v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 49 NE
110;
Montgomery v. Stephens, 4 A.L.R. 2d, at page
312, 69 s. 970.
We can understand how this testimony would be
admissible if a third party had been injured and was
suing both the Dastrups and the Allen Oil Company and
Kenneth Thoresen. If the action had been brought by a
third party, then the following quotation taken from 38
Arn. J ur., Sec. 185, page 862, would be applicable:
"Liability is established when it is shown that
the peril, being of the defendant's creation, was
known to the defendant, but not to the person injured; but no liability is predicable of the injury
when it appears that the injured person's knowledge of the danger surpassed or equaled that of
the defendant. As hereinbefore observed, the
basis of a liability of an owner or occupant of
premises in failing to render the premises reasonably safe for an inyitee must be predicated upon
his superior knowledge of the danger of the premises."
We submit that not only was it not error to exclude
the testimony of Mr. Allen, but it would have been error
to have admitted it. The admission of such testimony
might have given the jury the impression that it is the
duty of an invitee to guard against dangers created by
the invitor, and that his failure to guard against dangers
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created by the invitor per1nits recovery by the invitor.
Such, of course, is not the law.
See Gerald, et ux, v. Standard Oil of La. 10 S.
2d, 409, and particularly see page 412;
See Fritch v. Atlantic Refining Co., 160 A.
699, 151 A.L.R. 1269;
See Loos v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 99 U.
496, 108 P. 2d 254.
Referring again to the Complainants, there was no
allegation by the Plaintiffs of any negligence connected
""'"ith the fact that the tanks were installed in an open,
underground chamber, and since the evidence was not
proper as against Thoresen, it was properly excluded,
unless it was confined to the Allen Oil Company, 20 Am.
Jur., Sec. 253, page 246.
The evidence was not proper rebuttal testimony and
was properly refused.
See Smith v. Armstrong, 198 P. 2d 796.
In any event, the knowledge of the corporation was
gone into thoroughly by examination of Kenneth Thoresen, and inasmuch as the allegations are that the corporation knew of the condition, because of his knowledge,
no error could possibly have been committed.
38 Am. Jur., Sec. 268;
Ruocco v. United Advertising Corp., 30 A.L.R.
1237, 119 A. 48.
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In the case of Peterson v. Betts, 165 P. 2d 95, 3:t page
104, the Court said:
"It is said, however, that the jury could have
found that the corporation acquired the knowledge
'or should have known and realized,' etc. If it is
1neant by this that it was the corporation's duty to
inspect the premises before making delivery of
gasoline, the answer is, it had no such duty."
"Generally speaking, no duty rests, on a person who delivers gasoline, to inspect the premises
where a storage tank is located before making
delivery to the place provided for that purpose;
hence appellee's employee was under no duty to
inspect the premises where this storage tank was
located before making delivery."
In this case, the action was by the tenant, against the
landlord and the Oil Company.
The offer of proof as to the knowledge of Allen of
the installation and underground tanks, did not avail the
Appellants anything, because it wasn't the delivery to
the intake pipes provided by the Plaintiffs, or to the
tanks in the underground chambers alone, but it was the
fact that the witnesses testified that the set up was unsafe, because of the leakage and the accumulation of the
vapors, and because of holes under the action of the
pumps, the pumps, and the swing joints and connections
and the compressor and its proxin1ity, therefore, it would
not be in and of itself, negligence to deliver to the underground tanks, even though they knew they were underground and unfilled, because it was the other matters
that would be the proximate cause.
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It is sub1nitted that the exclusion of the evidence
was not reversable error.
3

~t\J:n.

Jur. Sec. 1030, page 585 and Sec. 1031,
page 587.

The Plaintiffs' evidence did not go toward any negligence in connection with the mere fact that the tanks were
installed in an underground, unfilled chamber, and if it
were offered to shovv that the Defendants knew of the
Plaintiffs' contributory negligence, it certainly would
not be a ground of defense, and not prejudicial to hi1n.
And, in any event, the evidence had no relation to the
issues presented by the Plaintiffs.
See Zuinga v. Evans, 87 U. 198, 43 P. 2d 513.
It would ap·pear that the Plaintiffs were now attempting to invoke the doctrine of something other than
contributory negligence, which is not the law of the State
of Utah.
See Johnson v. Lewis, 240 P. 2d 498 at page
500.
Our Court, in the case of Miller v. Southern Pacific Company, 82 U. 46, 21 P. 2d 865, condemned this doctrine,
21 p. 2d, 871.
By adopting the theory, at the end of the case, that
the underground tanks in an unfilled chamber, were unsafe, it would appear that the Plaintiffs are admitting
the theory of the Defendants, and attempting to excuse
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their contributory negligence on the ground that the Defendants knew about the contributory negligence.
There can be no contributory negligence unless the
Defendant is ~ty of negligence, having a direct and
proximate ~!~Q--;elation to the injury.
There was no pleading of wilful or wanton misconduct or intentional violence, and there was no theory
set forth by the Plaintiffs, either in pleadings or on trial,
as to this point, and therefore, the knowledge of the contributory negligence would not avail the Plaintiffs.
38 Am. Jur., Sec. 177, 178, page 853-854.
And since the Plaintiffs' knowledge of the storage place
for the tanks surpassed, or equaled that of the Defendants, no liability would be predicable on that knowledge.
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINT NO. III:
APPELLANTS' OBJECTION TO THE F AlLURE TO GIVE
THE PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NO.
6 AND 7 IS NOT FOUNDED ON PREJUDICIAL ERROR
AND IS NOT GROUND FOR REVERSAL.

The objection that was made as to the failure to give
these two instructions, was on the ground that the Court
had refused to instruct on such theory of the case (T.
591). As will be seen from the record, there was no contention on the part of the Plaintiffs, either in the pleadings or in the testimony, that the Defendants were guilty
of any wanton or wilfull act. In this case, the jury found
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against the Plaintiffs. The defense of contributory negligence \Yas pleaded and relied upon.
The facts in this case are : that Mr. Dastrup ordered
the gasoline delivered to his place; that Mrs. Dastrup
1neasureil the tanks and told the driver where to put the
gasoline. PreYious deliveries had been made to the same
place. There \Yas an invitation to the Defendants to deliver this gasoline to the premises, and there was no
\Yarning of any danger at all, except the statement by
:Jirs. Dastrup that she told the driver not to overflow the
tank.
The purpose of the requests could only have been
to have taken away from the Defendants, the defense of
contributory negligence; and for the Court to have found,
as a matter of law, that the Plaintiffs were not contributorily negligent. F'ron1 Plaintiffs' pleadings and the evidence of the Plaintiffs, the negligence was based upon
the spilling of gasoline, the dropping of the wrench, the
failure to have a _fire extinguisher, the scuffing of shoes
on the gravel, the failure to have chains on the truck, and
the filling of the tank, so that it created a dangerous
pocket of gas and static electricity. There was no theory
of knowledge advanced either in the pleadings or in the
trial.
It may be said, generally the question of contributory
negligence is for the jury to decide.
38 Am. Jur., Sec. 348, page 1052;
Downing v. Merchants' National Bank, 184
NW 722, 20 A.L.R. 1138.
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And especially in this case, where there was a grave question as to the proximate cause of the injury claimed by
the Plaintiffs.
38 Am. Jur., Sec. 351, page 1056.
And see the case of J. J. Mayou Mar11Ufacturing Co.
v. Consumers Oil and Refining Company, 146 P. 2d 738,
where the Plaintiff operated a plant where there was a
dryer, with a fire burner in the chamber, located in the
building, that when the driver, Millhouse, came there,
there was a fire in the dryer, and Millhouse carne into
the building, so that he could see the installation, and as
the Court said, the Plain tiff as well as Millhouse, knew
of the manner of the construction of the plant, (page 746).
It was the contention of the Defendants, that the Plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence, as a matter
of law, and as the·Court said (page 749):
"In this case, the question of contributory
negligence was submitted to the jury, they finding
against the Defendant, and it is, accordingly, only
necessary to determine whether the maintenance
of the plaintiff's plant was negligence per se."
The Court's decision went only to the point as to whether
or not the Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law, and the Court held adverse to that.
There is no holding in that case that the contributory
negligence should not have been submitted to the jury,
and as a matter of fact, it was, and the Court upheld
that submission.
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The question of la,vfulness is not the test in a matter
of contributory negligence. See the discussion in the
Jlayou. case, supra.
Contributory negligence is tortious conduct, and
negligence has been defined by our Court, in the case of
llliller z:. Sou.theTn Pacific Co., S:Z U. -l:G, 21 P. 2d, 865 at
page 871. In that case, the Court rejected a primary negligence as distinguished from contributory negligence.
It will be observed also that the Court gave Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No. 2 (T. 706), which held
Defendants to a high degree of care, regardless of where
delivered, and to the same effect, was Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No. 3, which was given as Instruction
No. 6, ( T. 755) and Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No.
4, which 'vas given as Instruction No. 7, (T. 755). And
in view of the Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No. 2
(T. 706), which was given in substance as Instruction
No. 8 (T. 756), the Plaintiffs, themselves, requested the
submission of the question of contributory negligence.
Requested Instructions No. 6 and 7 are conflicting with
Instruction No. 2 and request that the question of the
contrib:utory negligence, with regard to the premises of
the Dastrups, be taken from the jury. This, in view of
the fact, that Plaintiffs requested an Instruction concerning contributory negligence.
There was no evidence on either the part of the
Plaintiffs or Defendants, which related to negligence,
based upon a violation of law. And therefore, the Request concerning the fact that there were no acts of the
Plaintiffs which were unlawful, was not an issue in the
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case, and the Instruction on that was properly refused,
if by the Request, it was meant that unlawfulness consists of violation of a statute or ordinance, although that
is not very clearly set out in the Request. And as said,
in 38 Am. Jur., Sec. 15, page 657:
"Either negligence, or wilfull misconduct on
the part of one in the use of -his own property
resulted in injury to another, will make the property owner liable therefor, notwithstanding the
general purpose for which the property is used is
lawful."
While Plaintiffs, on page 22 of their Brief, make the
statement concerning the fact that most of the Defendants' witnesses operated in areas covered by city ordinances, it will be noticed, by referring to the testimony
of Mr. Dewey Olsen (T. 454), that he was not confining
his testimony to areas covered by City ordinances, and
the other witnesses testified likewise.
An unusual statement as made by Plaintiffs in their
Brief at page 23, to the effect that the trial Court had to
keep away from the jury, any affirmative suggestion
about what the Plaintiffs did on their premises didn't
necessarily deprive them of the right to recover. But
he went all out in instructing them what the Plaintiffs
did might well deprive them of their right to recover.
F·ollowing that statement, they refer to Instructions,
13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23.
The objection made by Plaintiffs' counsel to instruction No. 13 ( T. 593), was that the instruction was
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not supported by the law and the evidence, and that
it \Yas 1nisleading, and could only serve to confuse the
JUry.
It is sub1ni tted on the Record, that the Instruction
was founded upon the evidence and was an instruction
on the Defendants' theory of their case, and was a proper
instruction on contributory negligence. And the statement of Appellants, in their Brief at page 23, to the effect
that the Court 'vent all out in instructing that what the
Plaintiffs did might well deprive them of their right to
recover, is unusual, in view of the fact that contributory
negligence in any case, is founded on the defense of what
the Plaintiffs did, which might be neglect, and which
proximately contributed to produce their own damage.
The same can be said for Instruction No. 14. That the
objection to that Instruction (T. 594) in part, was on the
ground that it did not support Plaintiffs' theory of the
case. This was an Instruction given on contributory
negligence and on the theory of the Defendants' case .
. Instruction No. 16, was an instruction on the negligence of the Defendants, and clearly stated the law. The
only objection made to Instruction No. 16, was that it
was not supported by the law and the evidence (T. 594).
How can Appellant contend that Instruction No.-17
(T. 762) supports the thesis laid down at page 23 of their
Brief~ In any event, the only objection (T. 594) was that
the Instruction was not supported by the law and evidence.
Instruction No. 18 was an instruction on unavoidable
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accident, which has been recognized and approved by
our Court. The objection to that Instruction was made
upon the ground that it was not supported by the law
and the evidence, and that it was misleading, and that
there 'vas no evidence which would permit the jury to
find that there was an unavoidable accident. This is
solecisn1. The fact is, that the failure of evidence to show
negligence by either party, gives rise to the unavoidable
accident, so that the lack of evidence is what gives rise
to the instruction, and therefore, the statement made,
that there was no evidence which showed the lack of evidence, is illogical.

a

Instruction No. 19 was objected to on the ground that
it was contrary to the law and evidence, and that it was
n1isleading and would confuse the jury ( T. 594-595).
As was said in Globe arnd Rutgers Fire Ins. Co.
v. Standard Oil Co., 104 S. 707-708:
~AHd

ftuthet:

"We see no evidence of any negligence on the
part of the Defendant's agent; for we recognize
that large volumes of liquids ( 300 gallons here)
cannot be handled without spilling small quantities thereof at times. And to convict a vendor of
gasoline of negligence under such circumstances
would amount to making him an insurer towards
all against the dangerous properties of that
,
fluid."
ii'W~ "_We _do not me~n to say that~ h~ndler of
gasoline IS not required to handle It with some
;:
care, and need not take precautions against spill"ing it around. Indeed, his own safety requires him
1

i,

.
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to do so; but spilling 8mall quantities thereof is
unavoidable, and gasoline is an article of prin1e
necessity today; so that the public is bound to
share son1e s1nall part of the risk of handling it
. t h at part of the risk which is unavoidable."'
to "T1t,
Instruction No. 20 ( T. 7 63), was objected to on the
ground that it disregarded the Plaintiffs' theory of the
case and 'vould serve to confuse the jury.
There 'Yas no evidence 'vhatsoever introduced by
~1..ppellants, to sho"'" that the running of hot gasoline into
cool gasoline, had any effect at all, and so there could be
no instruction on that, and it was not Plaintiffs' theory
of the case, as will be shown by the Transcript of the
evidence, so the objection was not well taken.
Instruction No. 21 (T. 764) is a stock instruction, and
the substance of the Instruction is required by law, because six members of the jury must agree to a verdict.
And since it is an affirmative verdict that the instruction
covers, it was required that the Court instruct them that
six of the members must return such a verdict.
It is submitted that Instruction No. 22 is a statement
of the la,v. After Counsel for the Appellants (T. 595)
finished with the objections to the Instructions, and
stated, "That is all, your Honor," Counsel then came forward the next day with further objections: Objecting to
Instruction No. 21, on the ground it was not supported
by the law, that is to say, that the statement that six of
the jurors had to return a verdict for the Plaintiffs, was
not supported by the law, and objected to Instruction
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No. 22, that it was not supported by the law and evidence,
and Instruction No. 23, that it was not supported by the
law and evidence; and that there was no evidence of
negligence on the part of Dastrups, upon which the jury
could place liability on negligence. This Instruction No.
23 will be dealt with hereafter, inasmuch as Instruction
No. 9, which was given without objection, covers this
point.
It would appear that on page 23 of their Brief, Appellants objected to nearly every instruction which was
given, on the ground that the Court went all out in instructing that what the Plaintiffs did, might well deprive
them of their right to recover.
It is contended that the Court was technical in its
rulings against the Plaintiffs, because of some proceedings concerning the jury, but there was no objection by
Mr. Wilson, on this ground at all, and not having raised
the issue in the lower Court, he certainly cannot raise
it now.
To state that a feeling of extreme caution developed
on the Court's part, which resulted in all instructions requested for the Plaintiffs which stated the Plaintiffs'
theory being refused, is to contend that even though the
instructions were correct as to the law and evidence, the
Court should have instructed differently concerning the
liability of the Defendants and differently regarding
the theory of the Plaintiffs' case.
This is most interesting, in view of the fact that the
Plaintiffs, Appellants -here, requested seven instructions,
of which, four were given as amended (T. 706-709).
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.ANS"\V"ER TO APPELLANTS' POINT NO. IV:
THE POINT RAISED IN POINT IV OF APPELLANTS' BRIEF DOES NOT JUSTIFY A
REVERSAL OF THE VERDICT OF THE JURY .

.A.s to Point I\.,.. of . A. ppellants' Brief, relating to

Instructions X o. 13 and No. 14, it must be recalled that
the scope of an instruction, in a particular case, is to
be deternlined, not alone by the pleadings therein, but
also by the evidence in support of the issue.
53 AI11. J ur., Sec. 579, page 455;
Griffin YS. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,
102 U. 563; 133 P. 2d 333, 144 A.L.R. 1402,
at page 1407 .
. A.nd in considering the correctness and adequacy of a
charge to the jury, it should be taken as a whole and
read in its entirety.
Cromeenes vs. San Pedro, Los Angeles and
Salt Lake Railroad Co., 37 U. 475, 109, P.
10. Ann. cas. 1912 C. 307 ;
Anair vs. ~futual Life Insurance Co., 42 A. 2d.
423, 159 A.L.R. 547.
In the Utah case, it was said, 109 P., page 14:
"It is a familiar rule of law that all of the
instructions must be read and considered together, and if, as a whole, they contain a correct
statement of the law, applicable to the issue in a
case the court cannot be convicted of error, becau~e the law, applicable to the different questions involved, is separately stated. -In such
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cases, the instructions supplement each other, and
if, when read and considered as a series, they
contain a correct statement of the law, it is
sufficient".
And in view of the case cited, it is well to keep in mind,
Instruction No. 3, T. 753; Instruction No. 4, T. 754;
Instruction No. 5, T. 754; Instruction No. 6, T. 755;
Instruction No. 7, T. 755; Instruction No. 16, T. 761;
Instruction No. 19, T. 763; Instruction No. 20, T. 176;
and especially Instruction No. 6, relating to the care in
handling gasoline. This Instruction set out the test of
negligence of both the Plaintiffs and the Defendants.
Instruction No. 13, (after the Court defined negligence in
Instruction No. 4, and proximate cause, in Instruction
No. 5,) stated that a person, injured by the negligence
of another person, cannot recover against such other
person, if he, himself was negligent, and his negligence
contributed in any degree, however slight, to produce
his own injury and damage, and the Court went on
to say:
"This is what has been referred to in these
instructions, as contributory negligence".
In Instructions No. 13 and 14, the Court defined
the negligence to acts of Plaintiffs, with relation to their
underground tanks, compressor, storing gasoline, maintenance of the pumps, and the electric wiring, and the
piping, and said that the jury must find such negligence,
proximately contributed to produce Plaintiffs' damage.
In Instruction No. 14, the Court then proceeded to
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tell the jury \Yhat the duty of the Plaintiffs was with
regard to their installations, pu1nps and compressor.
See Edgar vs. Rio Grande Western Railroad
Co., 32 U. 330, 90 P. 745.
\Yhere the Court said :
··It \vas incumbent upon appellants to produce some substantial evidence, which would at
least tend to fasten the blame on defendant for
the n1isplaced S\vitch that caused the accident."
Whereas, in this case, the evidence leaves the matter
uncertain as to \vhether the Defendants, or some unknown
party is responsible for the act of negligence alleged,
and recovery cannot be had.
Pratt vs. Utah Light & Traction Co., 57 U.
7 at page 13, 169 P. 868.
In that case, the objection was made that the Court did
not specifically call the attention to the jury to the issue
made. Here, Counsel objects because the Court specifically set out the issues of fact upon which the jury was
to find whether there was negligence and contributory
negligence.
Johnson vs. Silver King Consolidated Mining
Co. of Utah, 54 U. 34, 179 P. 61;
Steggell vs. Salt Lake and U. R. Co., 50 U.
139, 167 P. 237.
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In the case of Brown vs. Woolverton, 121 S. 404,
64 A.L.R. 640, at page 644, the Court said:
"The contention is that they (the instructions) referred to the jury the question of law, to
wit, the meaning of 'due care'. The Court may
assume, however that the jury will understand
that a want of 'due care', 'ordinary care' or
'reasonable care' given in special charges, is equal
to negligence. If the plaintiff deemed them misleading, their explanatory charge should have
been requested."
And the Court said there was not reversable error in
giving these charges.
It is submitted that the Appellants did not request
an explanatory instruction.
In the case of Johnson vs. Kinney, 7 NW. 2d 188,
144 A.L.R. 997, at page 1002, the court said:
"The Court properly defined negligence and
ordinary care and told the jury in effect, that
contributory negligence was negligence on Plaintiff's part, which contributed to his injury, and
that plaintiff was under the duty to exercise
reasonable care under the facts and circumstances shown in the evidence. * * * At least, in
the absence of a request for a more co1nplete
definition, the instructions sufficiently define contributory negligence. * * $ . "
Counsel has cited the case of Loverde vs. Consumers
Petroleum Co., 63 N.E. 2d 673. The facts of that case
are not given. The case consists 1nostly of head notes,
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and "~hile Appellant has directed attention to a sentence
fron1 the head notes, there is no factual1natter to permit
us to disrern the application of the instruction to a given
set of circumstances and the evidence adduced in the
trial. In any event, the same case as to head note 2,
could be quoted for respondents' contention.
In the case of Johnson vs. Leu,is, 2±0 P. 2d 498, the
Court said:
~·Nowhere

in the instructions was the jury told
negligence is a necessary element of contributory
negligence and that there must be a causal relationship between the contributory negligence and
the accident."

N o,v, let's examine the Instructions in this case:
Instruction No. 3, instructed as to negligence, and that it
must be the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs' damage,
and Instruction No. 4, defined negligence. Instruction
No.5, defined proximate cause. Instruction No.6, defined
the care necessary in dealing with gasoline. Instruction
No. 13, stated directly, what acts of the Plaintiff, were
negligent, and if their negligence contributed in any
degree, however slight, to produce their own injury
and damage, that that was what was known as
contributory negligence, and the Court set out wherein
the jury must make a finding as to the negligence of
fhe Plain tiffs, and directed the jury to the fact that such
negligence must have proximately contributed to the
Plaintiffs' damage. Further, the Court, in Instruction
No. 14, directed the jury's attention specifically, as it did
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in Instruction No. 13, to the duty of the Plaintiffs with
relation to certain acts of the Plain tiffs, and again said,
in Instruction No. 14: "And if you further find that such
negligence proximately contributed to produce their own
damage, as defined and set forth· in Instruction No. 13
above."
So that the Johnson case was decided upon entirely
different instructions, as can be seen from said case, and
contrary to being a case in point for Appellants, upholds
Respondents' position.
Polly vs. McCarthey, 166 P. 2d 501, 109 U. 398;
Minor Dabney vs. Johnson Oil Corporation,
22 P. 2d 265, 28 P. 2d 23, at page 269.
It is apparent from the Instructions in this case,
that the elements of ommission, which the Court criticized in the Johnson vs. Lewis case, supra, are fully
covered by the Instruction in this matter before the
Court.
In the case of Johnson vs. Lewis, supra, the Court
based its decision on the fact that the Court omitted to
instruct the jury that before they can find the Plainiff
guilty of contributory negligence, they must find that
the Plaintiff committed a negligent act, or om1nission,
and that such negligent act proximately contributed to
causing the injury, for the Court called attention to the
fact that in the sentence which purported to set out all
the elements of contributory negligence, no mention was
made that such act or ommission, in order to defeat the
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mately contribute to cause the injury and damage
8n~tained.

It is sub1nitted, that in the instructions given by
the Court in this n1a tter, the jury was instructed that
the Plaintiffs 1nust be negligent in certain matters, and
that such negligence proximately contributed to produce
Plaintiffs' damage.
In the definition of contributory negligence, Instruction No. 13 (T. 759) and in Instruction No. 14 (T. 795760), the Court instructed as to what 'vould constitute
the negligence of the Plaintiffs, and the Court said that
the duty of the Plaintiffs, Dastrup, in connection with
these things set out in Instruction No. 14, was to maintain them in a safe condition of repair, and in Instruction
No. 13, the jury was instructed that the Plaintiffs had
to be negligent, and that the negligence had to proximately contribute to the Plantiffs' damage.
Instruction No. 4 set out the definition of negligence.
In Instruction No. 28 (T. 767), the jury was instructed that the Instructions were to be construed and
to be considered together as a whole. In that connection,
see Instruction No. 6 (T. 755).
In any event, the case of Johnson vs Lewis, supra,
must be read in the light of previous decisions of the
Supreme Court, relating to this subject, and must be
read in light of the facts before the Court in the
Johnson case.
Taylor vs. Bamberger Electric Railroad Co.,
62 U. 552, at page 567, 220 P. 695;
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Seliba vs. Seliba, 11 SW.2d 774, 61 A.L.R.
1348;
Snyder vs. Bicking, 181 A. 161, 102 A.L.R. 409.
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINT NO. V:
IT IS SUBMITTED THAT INSTRUCTION NO. 16,
CORRECTLY STATED THE LAW, IN VIEW OF
THE FACTS ADDUCED AT THE TRIAL AND
UNDER THE PLEADINGS.

Appellants' argument implies that the fact that the
truck was left unattended while gasoline was flowing,
was such negligence, that there could be no contributory
negligence on the part of the Plaintiffs, because it is
clear that the Instruction does not permit of the argument
advanced by Appellants, to wit: that the jury could have
assumed that such an act was not negligent.
The case cited by Appellants, J. J. Ma.you Manufacturing Co. vs. Consumers Oil Co., 146 P.2d 738, has
been referred to before in this Brief, and it is submitted
that the case is not authority for the point raised by
Appellants.
As has previously been pointed out in the Mayou
case, supra, even though the driver had let the oil run,
and had left the tanker, the Mayou case held only that
this was a rna tter to be taken in to consideration by the
jury, with other matters, in determining the negligence
of the Defendant.
See Pinter vs. Wenzel, 180 NW: 120;
Globe and Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., vs. Standard
Oil Co., 104 S. 707-708.
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The rase of ~T ola:tz 1.-·s. Haskett, 53 SW.2d 996, cited
by . A.ppellants, laid do,vn the rule that where the owner
of the truck jerked the hose from the pipe, even though
the driYer of the trurk had left the gasoline flowing
unattended, there \Yas a question for the jury, as to what
\Yas the proxin1ate cause of the injury. The court, in
that case, did not say that the leaving of the gasoline
flo,ving unattended, "Tas in and of itself negligence, Of
the proximate cause of the injury, but that in view of
the facts, it \vas for the jury to determine that. And
that \\Tas 'vhat 'vas done in this case.
See Cosden vs. Wright, 211 P. 2d 523;
Peterson vs. Betts, 165 P. 2d 95, at page 99.
From the testimony of Mr. Thoresen, the jury were
justified in finding that he did not leave the hose unattended until he was filling the third tank with about forty
or fifty gallons of gasoline, and that no gasoline escaped
\vhile he was away.
It is submitted that this Instruction was not erroneous.
65 Corpus Juris Secondum, Sec. 289, page
1237;
65 Corpus Juris Secondum, Sec. 11, page 387.
The jury may well have believed the evidence of
the Defendants, and they were entitled to so believe the
evidence of- the Defendants, and therefore, the Court
properly instructed as to the test of negligence of the
Defendants. This was especially true, in view of the fact
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that there was no evidence as to how the fire started.
There was no evidence that the spilling of the gasoline,
if there was such spilling, in any way was the cause of
the injury. And here, there was a complete lack of
evidence that anything happened, detrimental to the
Plaintiffs, because Mr. Thoresen left the hose unattended.
The positive evidence is that there was nothing resulted
from the rnere leaving of the scene, which would in any
way have caused the fire, because the positive testimony
of Mr. Thoresen is that there was no gasoline spilled
from the third tank where he had placed the hose when
he went into the store (T. 398).
Bogden vs. Los Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad Co., 59 U. 505 at page 523, 205 P. 571.
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINT NO. VI:
OBJECTION IS MADE TO THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTION NO. 18, ON THE GROUND THAT IT
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE LAW AND THE
EVIDENCE.

In order to support the hypothesis, Appellants state
on page 32 of their Brief, that the gasoline overflowed
where it could go down into the storage vault, and that
it was inevitable that an explosion, made of gas vapor
and air, would be formed, and that there were numerous
ways in which surface sparks could have been created,
and that the compressor engine did not go into operation
at any time during the occurrence of the explosion. That
there was no fire extinguisher on the truck; that there
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"~a~ no static chain on the truck to ground the electricity,

and that the Plaintiffs suffered thousands of dollars
'vorth of dan1age. The testimony does not support this
thesis: the eYidence does not show that the gasoline overflo,ved "~here it could go do,vn into the storage vault, or
that any but a sn1all amount overfio,ved, and that was
long before the third tank 'vas being filled.
The expert "~itnesses, on behalf of the Appellants
and Respondents, disagreed, moreover as to the cause of
the formation of the explosive mixture, and no witness
testified in 'Yha t \vay the explosive mixture was caused,
except Dr. Cook and Dr. Bryner, "\Vho testified that it
'vas from the dripping from the pump, or from leaks
in the pipes in the basement
Contrary to the statement made at page 32 of Appellants' Brief, the compressor engine did go on, according to the testimony of Mrs. Dastrup, which she later
said \Yas in error, and the jury were certainly justified
in believeing her first statement.
The fact that there was no fire extinguisher on the
truck certainly wasn't negligence, nor was it shown to
be the proximate cause of anything. Several fire extinguishers were used in an attempt to put out the fire.
As to the static chain, the direct testimony of Mr.
Thoresen is that there were two static chains.
And as to the Plaintiffs suffering thousands of
dollars worth of damage, it is questionable, under the
law, whether that damage was ever proven, pursuant to
the rules of evidence, and law.
The expert witnesses, on both sides, in their testi-
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mony gave firm basis for the Instruction No. 18, and the
Instruction was a correct statement of the law.
Lindon vs. Miller, 177 NW. 902, 12 A.L.R. 665;
Greenwell vs. Burba, 182 SW.2d 436;
Anding vs. Byrd-Harman Drilling Co., 141
SW.2d 1018;
Evans vs. Texas Pacific-Missouri Pacific Terminal, Railroad Co., 134 F·ed. 2d 275, Certiorari denied, 319 lT.S. 756, 87 L. Ed. 1709;
O'Brecht vs. Cedar Rapids Oil Co., 170 NW
785·
Texas 'Co. vs. Charles Clark and Co., 182
sw. 351;
Simpson vs. Standard Oil Co., 8 Alaska 275;
Bruchis vs. Victory Oil Co., 153 S. 828;
Allegretti vs. Murphy-Niles Co., 119 NE.2d
389.
And as said in 65 Corpus Juris Secondum, page 301:
"Whether an instruction on inevitable accident should be granted in any case, depends on
the facts of the particular case."
It will be noted, that the Court, in its Instruction,
said that if both parties used reasonable care and prudence, and in spite of that, the accident occurs, then no
person is responsible to the other person for the happening of the accident. However, the Court went on further
to say, that the Defendants could be held for the damages,
if the jury found Defendants negligent, in some particular alleged in the Complaint, and that the negligence
was the proximate cause of the damage. So the Court

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

75
fully instructed the jury that they could find the Defend-

ants liable, by finding then1 negligent. · But instructed
also, that if there was no negligence on anyone's part,
no person was responsible.
Respondents have already com1nented on the case
of Nola'n rs. Haskett, 53 SW.2d 996, under heading No. V,
so that discussion will not be enlarged.
In the case of Ou·ens vs. llf oberly, however, 245 SW.
369, Respondents wish to point out that that was a
delivery of gasoline from a tank truck, to an intake pipe
located in the front of the building, and about fifteen
feet from the blacksmiths forge, which contained a fire,
and the question of negligence was the blowing of gasoline fumes, by the wind, in a direct line from the spigots
of the truck to the forge, and the failure of the Defendant
to use a hose to connect the faucets of the filler pipe, but
instead, allowing the gasoline to fall ten inches in the
air into the funnel, so as to produce a dangerous degree
of vaporization. There was no such evidence here at
all, and the cited case cannot be eligible on any point.
In the case before this Court, there is positive testimony that there were drag chains to conduct the static
electricity (T. 394), and the Pitcher case, 289 Fed. 678,
cited by Appellants, was a case where the jury found in
favor of the plaintiff on the facts, and all the court was
doing there, was saying that the jury was justified in so
f:::1ding. Also, in that case, the filling pipe into the
delivery truck fell to the ground and gasoline flowed out.
And further, in that case, the plaintiff was not the person
to whom the gasoline was being delivered. There, it will
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be noted, that in that case, the court was passing upon
the sufficiency of allowing the jury to find from all of
the facts, the negligence of the defendants. It was not
passing upon negligence as a matter of law.
See Haarstrich vs. Ore. Short Line, 70 U. 552
at page 559, 262 P. 100..
Where it is said :
"It is a fundamental fact that no matter how
gross the negligence complained of may be, it
creates no liability, unless it is the proxi1nate
cause of the injury."
It is submitted that there was no error In giving
Instruction No. 18, because of the facts in this case.
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINT NO. \rii:
APPELLANTS SEEM TO THINK THAT THE
MERE SPILLING OF THE GASOLINE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THE PROXIMATE CAUSE
OF THE EXPLOSION, AND THEREFORE, OBJECTS TO THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTION
NO. 19.

The Court had already instructed, as has been previously pointed out, in Instruction No. 6 ( T. 755) and
Instruction No. 7 (T. 755), as to the care required in
the handling of gasoline.
It must be remembered, that in this case, there was
no third party involved, as there was in the cases cited
by Appellants. The Court had before it the facts, that
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the t\YO Plaintiffs, through son1e negligence of their own,
could haYe ignited the ga8oline or gas vapor, or that the
Defendants could have done so.
~Irs.

Dastrup and Neal Dastrup were acting for
Flora Dastrup and La Forge Dastrup in telling Mr.
Thoreson about filling the tanks. There was no case
here of son1e third party throwing a match into spilled
gasoline. Further, there was no evidence of very much
gasoline being spilled, and there was no evidence that
that sn1all amount of gasoline would form a dangerous
situation. Therefore, the Court was faced with a probleu1
entirely different than in the cases cited, and if the Court
had instructed other,vise than it did, it would have taken
away from the Defendants, the defense of contributory
negligence, because the evidence in this case did not
disclose anyone but the Plaintiffs or Defendants that
could have been responsible for the ignition of the gasoline. If the Plaintiffs ignited it by their negligent act,
or if their negligent act concurred with that of the
Defendants and was a contributing cause of the explosion,
they could not recover, and the Court was saying only
that the spilled gasoline had to be ignited by some
negligent act of the Defendants. This is similar to what
the Court said in the case of Standard Oil of New Y orlc

vs. R. I. Pitcher) supra.
See 16 Am. St. Reports 253;
Cole vs. German Saving Society, 124 Fed.
113, 63 L.R.A. 416;
Smith vs. Associated Oil Co., 199 P. 879;
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Pulaski Anthracite Coal Co. vs. Gibboney Sand
Co., 66 SE. 73, 9 A.L.R. 933;
Shawnee vs. Bennett, 243 P. 190, ~5 A.L.R. 796;
Pure Oil Co. vs. Chicago Railroad Co., 185
P. 150;
Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., vs. Standard
Oil Co., 104 S. 707 at 708;
Mon dine vs. Sarlin, 81 P .2d 903, 72 P .2d. 930;
Grigsby & Co. vs. Bratton, 163 SW. 804;
F'redricks vs. Atlantic Refining Co., 127 A.
615, 38 A.L.R. 666.
Gibson Oil Co. vs. Sherry, 291 s.w. 66;
Me Cullough vs. Horten, 74 P.2. 1.
In the case of Bruening '0·s. El Dorado Refining Co.,
53 Fed. Supp. 356, the contention was made that the
defendant allowed gasoline to be spilled. This was
one of the grounds of negligence alleged. But the Court,
in discussing that case, where the plaintiffs were attempting to bring the case under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, as to the evidence required to maintain their
action, stated at page 358:
"And plaintiffs state that if the defendant
had exercised due care in the handling and
delivery of such gasoline, the same would not
have been spilled or allowed to escape, get out
of or from said appliances onto said floor in such
dangerous quantities and said fire would not have
been causd by said gasoline so being caused to
catch fire and to burn said building."
"This is both speculative and conjectural on
the part of the petitioner. Where the rule of res
ipsa loquitur is inapplicable it becomes the duty
of the pleader to assert in stating a cause of
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action that the negligence of the defendant occurring through its driver or operator caused the
fire and dan1age. It does not appear that the
operator is not available to the plaintiffs for
obtaining infor1nation under oath as to the cause
of the conflagration. There are 1nany causes that
may have operated to produce the fire. The portable tanks of the garage owner may have been
defective. The condition of the building with its
wooden floors where gasoline and other inflammable materials were constantly kept may have
occasioned the fire."
In the case of Spence vs. A1nerican Oil Co., 197 S·E.
46S, 118 A.L.R. 1120, where the Restatement Of The Law
of Torts, , . . ol. :2, Negligence, page 1173, Sec. 435, was
quoted \Yith approval at page 1127, in commenting on
the evidence relating to the overflowing of gasoline and
the escaping and running down the street, where one
seeing it wondered if it was water or gasoline, and
struck a 1natch and threw it into it, the court said:

"'We think it is perfectly patent, that between
the alleged negligence of the Standard, and the
injury to the property of the plaintiff, there were
efficient and independent intervening agencies,
negligent or otherwise, which were destructive of
any sequential connection between the alleged
original wrong of the Standard and the damage
to the plaintiff."
"And furtlier, as to the original wrong, attributed to the Standard, it cannot be said, or
convincingly reasoned, that the injury to the
plaintiff is accepted by common experience as
naturally and fully in sequence to it, and it 1nay
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be, the plaintiff said, 'that the wrong and the
damages are not sufficiently conjoined or concatenated, as cause and effect to support an
action.' "
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINT NO. VIII:
No exception was taken as to the Plaintiffs Dastrup
s.eparately.
THE POINTS URGED IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANTS' POINT NO. VII. ARE REITERATED
AS SUPPORT FOR THE ARGUMENT THAT THE
GIVING OF INSTRUCTION NO. 22, WAS NOT
PREJUDICIAL.

Instruction No. 22 (T. 764) was an instruction which
said, that if other persons than the Defendant were
negligent, and such negligence of such persons was the
proximate cause of the explosion, it would be necessary
to find that the Defendants' negligence combined with
the negligence of such other person to produce the
damage, before the jury could find in favor of" the
Plain tiffs.
It will be submitted, that in the exception to this
Instruction, the Appellants took merely a general exception, and did not attempt to point out wherein said
Instruction was erroneous, or present an instruction to
elucidate the point to which they might have objected.
In view of the evidence before the Court, it was
uncertain as to how the explosion occurred, and there was
some question by some of the experts as to whether or
not the starting of the pump by Mr. Cox may not have
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caused the explosion, and it is clear that the Instruction
''"'as proper.
See Pierre vs. Liberty Oil Co., 183 NW. 437;
Pinter YS. \Y" enzel, 180 NW. 120;
Konchar Ys. Cedular, 3 A.:2d 913;
Fritsch vs. Atlantic R.efining Co., 160 A. 699.
""">\.KS\Y"ER TO .A.PPELLANTS' POINT NO. IX:
RESPONDENTS CONTEND THAT AS TO POINT
NO. IX, RAISED BY APPELLANTS, THE RULE
LAID DOWN AT 64 CORPUS JURIS, Sec. 729, Page
933 IS APPLICABLE.

It is said, in 6-! Corpus Juris, Sec. 729, page 933
and 93-!, that a party cannot complain of an instruction
which 'Yas consented to, or its correctness admitted
by him.
Blain vs. Yockey, 184 P. 2d 1015;
State for use of F·orman vs. W oolyhan Transportation Co., 65 A. 321 ;
Rules 51 and 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Record shows that no objection was made to
Instruction No. 9, for Mr. Swan, who was making the
objections to Instructions, states:
"Objects to the Court giving Instruction No.
9, and the whole thereof, unless there is added
thereto, on the 4th line of page 12, after the word,
'association', the following: And make payments
to and for the benefit of Dean Cox. And further,
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on the grounds and for the reasons that such
Instruction, if not corrected as stated, js contrary
to the law and evidence." (T. 592)
The Court then said:
"I believe 1naybe there won't be any quarrel
about that. I think that correction probably
should be made * *." (T. 592).
On page 595 of the Transcript, Mr. Swan said:
"That's all, your Honor."
And it wasn't until Saturday, October 21, 1950, at 9:00
o'clock A.l\1., that 1\ir. Swan then made a further objection to the giving of Instruction No. 23. Instruction No.
23 and Instruction No. 9, insofar as they relate to the
objection made by the Appellants, are almost identical.
In Instruction No. 9, the jury was told that they should
find in favor of the Plaintiff, Employers Mutual Liability
Insurance Co., unless the jury found that Dean Cox was
guilty of contributory negligence, as defined in these
Instructions. In Instruction No. 23, the jury was told
that as to the Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co.,
that if the jury found that Dean Cox, driver of the
truck belonging to Moon Lake Electric Association, was
negligent in any respect, and such negligence proxin1ately
contributed to cause the explosion and fire, then the
E1nployers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., could not
recover.
As said by the Court, in his Memorandum (T. 794)
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at (T. 803), there was no objection by Appellants to
the subn1ission of the question of con tributary negligence
in Instruction No. 9, and no objection was made separately on behalf of the Plaintiff, Ernployers Mutual
Liability Insurance Co., and the objection wa.s made
generally.
Since the mat'ter of contributory negligence was
submitted in Instruction No. 9, without objection, it
cannot be said that it was prejudicial for the Court to
give Instruction No. 23 (T. 757-764). But further than
that, there is evidence of negligence on the part of Dean
Cox, as pointed out herewith: Dr. Cook (T. 516-617),
testified that in his opinion, the slopping of gasoline on
the manifold of the car of lVIr. Cox, could have caused
the ignition of the fire. It is quite clear that there was
sufficient evidence in the record to require submission
of the contributory negligence of Dean Cox to the jury
under proper instruction.
It was testified to by LaF'orge Dastrup that the
pumps were operated by electric motors, and that a
hand crank n1ade the contact by pulling a little fiat piece
of metal out, which put the motor in contact with the
power, and the motor turned a drive belt that pulls the
pump (T. 19).
Lynn Jones testified that the pumps shouldn't have
been placed over the vault, with an opening directly over
e~e -vault, because the pump leaks all the time and allows
a little gasoline to drip (T. 463).
Mr. Thoresen testified that he heard a pump start
up shortly before the explosion ( T. 401).
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Dr. Gardner, a witness on behalf of the Defendants,
testified that there was a gentleman filling his tank with
gasoline at the time of the explosion, and that there were
feet in motion at that time, and it was very likely that a
nail on the man's shoe, on the concrete, could have caused
the spark, (T. 302). And further, that one of the people
that might have caused the spark was the person who
drove in to fill his tank (T. 313).
In the testimony of Dean Cox, he said that he was
filling his gasoline tank when the explosion occurred
( T. 328), and that he was taking gasoline fro1n the
west tank (T. 332).
And further, in view of the fact that Appellants had
acquiesced in the submission of Instruction No. 9, \vhich
contained the same matters to which they now object,
it was incumbent upon them to request a clarifying
instruction, and not be content with a mere general
objection to Instruction No. 23. Clearly, the Court could
have been mislead in the action of the Appellants in
acquiescing to Instruction No. 9, and making a ge:r:eral
objection to Instruction No. 23.

ANSWER TO
AND XI:

APPELLANTS'

POINTS

NO. (X

THE APPELLANTS CONTEND THAT THERE
WAS ERROR. IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL IN THE CASE OF EMPLOYERS
MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE CO., AND IN
THE CASE OF THE PLAINTIFFS, DASTRUP.

The discussion of this case has taken into consideraSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

85
tion the la"T relating to negligence, proximate cause,
contributory negligence and damage.
The question relating to lnstruction No. 23 has been
fully covered herein.
Plaintiffs' Counsel has made reference to the Court's
:Jiemorandum on the denial of the Motions for New Trial,
conm1encing at T. 794. It "\vas the contention of the
Respondents that the time for making the J\fotion for
a Xe"\Y Trial had run, and therefore, the Court was without jurisdiction to grant a new trial. For discussion of
the contention, see Transcript 795 to 797.
Counsel has n1ade some reference of the fact that
the pumps were owned by the Defendants. The evidence
concerning this "\Yas that the pumps had been under
the sole control of the Appellants, Dastrup, and that
the~~ had been buried for three or four years (T. 90),
and that the installation was all made by him, or under
his direction, and that they were put into the vault
in the Spring of 1946 (T. 16). That he owned one pump
and one tank (T. -±2), but nowhere in the testimony is
there any evidence showing which tanks, or pumps were
owned by Allen Oil Company. That he gave one of the
tanks to his brother ( T. 101). That he reburied the
tanks, except one ( T. 119). Nowhere in the testimony is
there any allegation of ownership or control on behalf
of the Allen Oil Company.
Respondents respectfully refer the Court to Rule 61,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and earnestly say that
from the record of these cases, the testimony and the
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verdict of the jury on such testimony, the Court was
justified in denying the Motion for New Trial, and
Respondents urge that substantial justice was done in
this Inatter, and there was no ground for granting a new
trial on the ground that the verdict was inconsistent
with substantial justice.
CONCLUSION
While Counsel for the Appellants states, on page 44
of their Brief, that they have a firm conviction that the
jury was not properly instructed, and that many of the
Court's rulings were erroneous, and that the Plaintiffs
are definitely entitled to a new trial, it is strongly· urged,
on the part of the Respondents, that the Motions of the
Respondents, (T. 364) and (T. 425), should have been
granted.
65 Corpus Juris Secondum, S.ec. 251 at Page
1119.
And that the Motions of the Respondents (T. 587 to 589)
should have been granted.
Peterson vs. Betts, et al, 165 P .2d 95;
Cosden vs. Wright, 211 P.2d 523.
This case was tried for a week at Duchesne, Duchesne
County, State of Utah. Many witnesses testified. A great
deal of time was spent on this case. A previous case had
been filed and dismissed. Many Motions were made to
Complaints and Amended Complaints, and a jury, who
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were citizens of the locality where Flora and LaForge
Dastrup live, brought in a verdict in favor of the
Defendants.
Respondents urge the Court to sustain that verdict
and not to grant a reversal of this case, for to do so, in
view of the pleadings and evidence in this case, would
be contrary to the clear intent of Rule 61, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Respectfully Subn1itted
JOHN D. RICE,
Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent, Allen Oil Co.
DALLAS H. YOUNG,
Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent, Kenneth Thoresen.
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